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ABSTRACT 
While much research has been done concerning other factors affecting foreign 
policy, there have been few attempts to understand how culture affects foreign policy. 
This is in spite of the fact that many scholars have commented on the relevance of 
culture to foreign policy outcomes. The object of this research project is to 
demonstrate how a specific form of culture, how a state perceives its role in the 
world, affects foreign policy decision-making. Also, this research project seeks to 
demonstrate that this form of culture is rooted deep in the past but evolves due to 
transition in the social characteristics of the international system. As culture evolves, 
specific patterns of decision-making manifest themselves. The specific patterns of 
decision-making to be analyzed in this project are Turkey and China in the period 
between WWI and the end of the Cold War. A comparison of Turkish and Chinese 
decision-making under similar circumstances, the Turkish decision to comply with 
American demands in the Cyprus crisis of 1964 and the Chinese decision to ignore 
Soviet attempts to deter the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979, will provide a more 
focused depiction of how differing cultural perspectives affect the way leaders 
understand their foreign policy alternatives and affect their decisions. 111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION: BASIC ISSUES, METHOD AND OUTLINE 1 II. NEW CULTURAL THEORY AND FOREIGN POLICY 20 III. THE GLOBAL AND IDEOLOGICAL NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 41 IV. TURKEY AND THE WORLD DURING THE OTTOMAN PERIOD AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 67 V. CHINA AND THE WORLD BEFORE AND AFTER WESTERN INTERVENTION 87 VI. COMPARING DECISIONS UNDER CONDITIONS OF IMMEDIATE EXTENDED DETERRENCE 107 VII. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 136 WORKS CITED 154 VITA 172 
iv 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: BASIC ISSUES, METHOD AND 
OUTLINE In his attempt to provide a new understanding of the workings of the international system, Alexander Wendt claims that to understand state behavior in the international system, one must be aware of both the constitutive effects of the international system that influence a given state and the domestic factors at work within that state (1999: 28). Although Wendt does not particularly seek to understand the behavior of specific states, his claim illuminates two important criticisms that have been raised concerning the state of theory in the field of international relations. First, while rational choice studies have contributed to some extent to our understanding of foreign policy and decision making (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Mor 1991), many have decried the inability of rational choice attempts to explain much of what is interesting and important pertaining to international relations (Green and Shapiro 1994). This has led to the recent strong interest in cognitive approaches to the study of international politics. A second issue that has been raised is the poverty of analyzing international relations at a single level of observation, whether it be the individual level, the national level, or the systemic level. Many studies have attempted to demonstrate the primacy of one level of analysis while ignoring other levels, leading to a situation where much that may be important is discounted. These 1 
two criticisms are particularly relevant to Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics ( 1979), widely held to be the most influential piece of international relations research in the last quarter century (Goldman 1996: 403). Not only have these two issues been important in the study of international relations, but also in the related field of foreign policy. Foreign policy studies are an outgrowth of international relations and decision making studies (Snyder, et al, 1962). While there have been attempts to form a general theory of foreign policy, (Rosenau, 1966) this goal has not been achieved, largely because of the complexity of the field. Foreign policy studies are in some ways even more complex than international relations, because of the variety of approaches and methods involved. The nature of foreign policy studies is summed up by one foreign policy scholar as " .. . somewhat unusual in that it deals with both domestic and international arenas, jumping from individual to state to systemic levels of analysis, and attempts to integrate all of these aspects into a coherent whole" (Gerner 1995: 17). In other words, there are factors both inside and outside the state that affect its foreign policy. Those favoring an inside approach advocate inquiries involving factors such as perception, psychological needs, and cultural influences (Legg and Morrison 1981 ). Advocates of an outside approach such as Waltz ( 1979) or Wendt ( 1999), attempt to understand the ramifications of international structures. The difference between outside and inside approaches has been referred to as the difference between explaining and understanding (Hollis and Smith, 1990). The objective of this study is to develop a model of foreign policy analysis that accounts both for cognitive or constructivist 2 
(inside) factors and systemic (outside) influences on foreign policy, and also to illuminate the nature of the relationship between the two. Theory and Model The model proposed in this study involves several specific variables of analysis. The first element to be assessed is the nature of the international system. Instead of assuming that states are socialized into an international system with a fixed nature as do structural realists (Waltz 1979), the proposed model's conception of the international system is one that changes and reformulates itself through time (Wendt 1999; Koslowski and Kradocwil 1994). Factors influencing change include technological advances and evolving ideas of community (Kennedy 1987), and just as the prevailing system affects the foreign policy of states, so may the actions of states cause changes in the nature of the international system. While structural realists may question the idea of an evolving international system, scholars with other perspectives and from other social science fields have acknowledged that the international system has changed over time and have attempted to identify specific time periods in international relations. An example of one such epoch in international relations is the period between the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War, when the modem idea of the nation began to crystallize and wars began to be fought between "peoples" instead of between "kings" (Palmer 1986: 119). During this time the nature of production, government, and warfare changed, and the argument here is that this in tum changed the nature of the international system which then acted as a force for change at the state level. Of course, assigning 3 
a precise starting and ending point to such an era is a difficult task and is not likely to be met with unanimous agreement. The main reason for disagreement is that history can be conceived from a variety of viewpoints. Nevertheless, if historical evidence is to yield any conclusions, this is a task in which social scientists must be engaged (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981: 331). An important consideration related to the transformation of the international system and its effect on states is the issue of how quickly states come to an understanding of the transformation. Some states may adapt to a new environment rapidly, while others are slower to perceive changes in the international system. This is because the salience of events that bring about transformation in the international environment may be felt less deeply in some societies than others, causing a time lag before older ideas are updated to meet new realities. In other words, path dependency may delay the adoption of a new worldview (Hausner, et al, 1995). Also, and particularly relevant to this study, some states may be incapable of making foreign policy decisions at certain times because of civil strife or domination by foreign powers. The second factor in foreign policy decision making to be assessed is the political culture of the state involved. While many domestic political considerations may have implications for foreign policy, such as bureaucratic politics (Allison 1971; Destler 1972) public opinion (Russett and Graham 1989), interest group effects (Dietrich 1999), media effects (Jakobsen 1995), and regime type (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Oneal, et al, 1996; Waltz 1967), this study will focus on political culture and how it affects perception of situations. Political culture has been in and 4 
out of vogue in the field of comparative politics over the last four decades, largely because " ... the concept has been hard to pin down with any intellectual rigor, yet it is also indispensable for serious thinking about the workings of human society and the behavior of people" (Pye 2000:20). The primary problem for the political culture approach has been its inability to explain societal change (Eckstein, 1988). This handicap has rendered much of traditional cultural theory, which was developed by cultural anthropology and held among its key assumptions that societal cultures are " . .  . logically consistent, highly integrated, consensual, resistant to change, and clearly bounded . . . ," useless (Sewell, Jr., 1999: 55). However, recent formulations of cultural theory have attempted to accommodate and explain societal change. Swidler (1986) argues that a given society possesses many cultural traits, any of which may be more salient in some situations and less salient in others. What is important about her model is that it attempts to explain how external events, such as a changing international environment, can transform political culture. Similarly, Sahlins (1985) claims that culture is " .. . historically reproduced in action" (p.vii). Drawing on the work of Clifford Geertz (1973), who proposed that culture should be understood as system of symbols, Sahlins articulates a concept of culture that is based on symbols which undergo reinterpretation during periods of environmental change. In this way, cultural system and cultural practice are linked (Sewell, Jr., 1999). Culture plays an inherent part in any process or relationship. Therefore, there are an infinite number of kinds of culture. This study addresses a specific dimension of culture, how a society views its place in the world. A society's perception of its 
5 
position in the international arena reveals itself in the form of patterns that have endured over many centuries. These patterns demonstrate that societies do possess distinctive characteristics that affect the perceptions and actions of their members. Of course, these patterns are abstract, and manifest themselves in varying ways according to conditions during a particular period of history. Because the international environment is not stable, a society is inevitably forced to change its foreign policies, but the new policies are still conditioned by what has gone before. This is the case, according to Michel Foucault, because " .. .it is part of the function of memory and culture to be able to reactualize any objects whatever that have already featured. Repetition is always possible; repetition with application, transformation" 
(45). A common example of this familiar to most Americans would be the idea of the missionary mentality in American culture. Whereas Americans have always believed that America should play a civilizing role in the world (Robertson 1980: ch.3), the actual content of this civilizing message has changed over time. While in the earlier times the content involved Christianity, today it is more likely to include ideas about liberal economic policy and human rights standards that may or may not be related to religion. Whereas the symbol, which in this case is the idea of the civilizing mission, retains its power, the actions related to the symbol have been transformed by the increasingly secular nature of the modern world. This certainly does not mean that culture is the only or even the major variable in foreign policy decision-making. In many cases the other variables such as the ones referred to above, may be more important. However, culture does affect how facts 6 
are interpreted and this means that the best way to assess how culture affects 
decision-making is to analyze it in conjunction with other factors. The proposed 
model in this study seeks to integrate the two concepts related above, the 
transforming nature of the international system and a malleable conception of culture, 
so that foreign policy may be more better analyzed. While related to earlier strategic 
culture (Booth 1979) and national style studies (Terhune 1970; Holsti 1970), such a 
model would provide an enhanced understanding of the adaptability of strategic 
culture to the changing international environment. 
What would corroborating evidence for such a model look like? The answer 
that this study proposes is a specific pattern of decision making that exhibits itself 
over time. Also important is a consideration of other factors that are believed to 
affect decision making. By analyzing both culturally influenced patterns of decision 
making and contending influences on decision making in competition, it is hoped that 
at the very least a better understanding of cultural effects on foreign policy can be 
gained. One way to do this is by examining specific decision opportunities within 
the pattern. This requires an in depth consideration of the factors relevant in a 
specific society at a certain point in time, thus marrying comparative politics and 
international relations theory. Therefore, comparative case study is an appropriate 
method for demonstrating how factors may operate differently in different societies. 
Framework for Analysis 
The framework that I am going to use to test my model is immediate extended 
deterrence. The literature on immediate extended deterrence offers a useful 
7 
framework for examining and comparing decisions. Immediate extended deterrence is a situation in which an attacker contemplates military action against another country and a third party commits itself to the defense of the country threatened with attack (Lebow and Stein 1988; Huth and Russett 1984; 1988). In other words, immediate extended deterrence involves an instance in which country A agrees to defend country B from an attack by country C. I will further elaborate on this concept in the description of cases below. Immediate extended deterrence is particularly useful because it presents a situation in which the attacking state must make a choice of whether to go ahead with its plan of attack or back down. Also, prior research has been undertaken to compile case lists for immediate extended deterrence. These lists facilitate the task of selecting comparable cases for analysis. Nevertheless, there is still room for differing interpretations of the qualifications in the above definition. This has caused a considerable discrepancy in the number of cases on each list. Whereas Huth and Russett identify sixty seven cases of immediate extended deterrence between 1902 and 1988, Lebow and Stein, applying a more conservative interpretation, find that only eleven cases in the Huth and Russett list actually qualify as such (cited in Lebow and Stein, pp. 338-341). Lebow and Stein give detailed examples of why several of Huth and Russett's cases are problematic. These include the inability to ascertain commitment to attack, inability to ascertain commitment to deterrence, and instances where compellence (actually using military force as opposed to merely threatening military action) or direct deterrence (a country deters a challenger from attacking itself instead of 8 
deterring the challenger from attacking a third party) are mistaken for cases of 
immediate extended deterrence. 
Because many of the cases in the Huth and Russett set are in doubt, immediate 
extended deterrence is not amenable to large-n study without being vulnerable to 
charges of conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970). While there have been attempts to 
analyze deterrence quantitatively, these attempts have met with limited success (Levy 
1989). Instead, a small-n study of cases is more appropriate so that the concept of 
immediate extended deterrence can be better understood. While not being able to 
develop grand theory, a study of this type is capable of generating partial 
generalizations (Lijphart 1971). Moreover, the chosen method of analysis best 
serves both the goals of better understanding foreign policy generally and immediate 
extended deterrence specifically. 
The Cases 
Both of the cases I have chosen have been confirmed by both Huth and 
Russett and Lebow and Stein. Nevertheless, because of problems found with cases in 
both lists, this study will also attempt to independently confirm the cases. The cases 
below were chosen for several reasons. First among these reasons is that the 
decisions made in both cases do not conform to the rational model of decision 
making. Second, the decisions in both cases do conform to a pattern of foreign policy 
decision making during a specified era. Third, the patterns of decision making in 
both cases stretch over a period lasting beyond the reign of any one leader, therefore 
ruling out idiosyncratic decision making arguments. 9 
The cases are the Turkish decision to acquiesce to American pressure in 1964 and the Chinese decision to challenge Russian deterrence in defense of Vietnam in 1979. These and their qualifications will be briefly explained below in the following manner. First, the general historical elements of the Turkish and Chinese cultures in the form of patterns that have endured over many centuries will be introduced. Then, I will discuss the foreign policy decisions of the Turkish and Chinese governments during a specific era of decision-making, the First World War until the conclusion of the Cold War, that conform to a more specific pattern. Finally, the specific deterrence encounter decisions will be briefly analyzed. The characteristics that I want to focus on are the Turkish desire for identification with civilization and the Chinese need to demonstrate the greatness of their culture. Both of these cultural traits have grown out of the historical and geographical characteristics unique to each of these countries, and as related above, these traits have been illustrated in different ways at different times. Concerning Turkey, the specific contention here is that during the twentieth century the Turkish search for civilization embodied itself in recurring attempts to affiliate itself with Western international organizations. In earlier centuries the Turks exhibited a tendency to attach themselves to other groups and live in community with these groups. During their trek from Central Asia toward the Anatolian peninsula the Turks encountered many groups and experimented with varoius cultures and religions, making them perhaps the only ethnic group to practice all of the world's major religions. Finally the Turks settled in Anatolia and adopted the Islamic faith. 10 
Where other communities were in the end deemed unacceptable by the Turks, the strength of Islam and its monotheistic nature appealed to them. The Turks were content to live as part of the Ottoman Empire along with the Arabs and Persians as the Empire enjoyed centuries of success and expansion. However, the rise of European power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries brought about a corresponding decline in Ottoman fortunes. In the wake of the First World War the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Turks were once again without a larger community with which to identify. Also, once again the Turks sought to join the group of states that represented the dominant civilization of the day. Although the Western Allies first sought to absorb and divide Turkey, the Turks fought to establish a new republic and then attempted to become a member of the Western group of states. This effort to adopt Western civilization was largely embodied in the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, who became president of the Turkish Republic in 1922. Under Kemal and his successors the Turks joined the League of Nations and acted in accordance with League sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian crisis of 1935. While not actively participating in the Second World War, the Turks made a formal declaration of war against Germany in early 1945, thereby gaining membership in the fledgling United Nations. Following the war, Turkish attempts to join the Western community increased. In 1950 the Turks sent troops to participate in the UN police action in Korea. Shortly thereafter Turkey gained membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, realizing a long coveted goal. Throughout the rest of the fifties and during the early sixties the Turks attempted to enter into more multinational treaties with Western states, largely ignoring the interests of the 11 
many newly independent nonwestern countries of which Turkey might possibly have 
become the leader. 
The Chinese record stands in strong contrast to that of the Turks, because the 
Chinese have historically believed in the essential distinctiveness and superiority of 
their culture. This is largely due to China's position as the largest and most central 
country in East Asia. States surrounding China often adopted Chinese characters for 
writing and imitated Chinese cultural and governmental practices, further contributing 
to China's sense of superiority. Although China was militarily subdued and 
conquered by the Mongols and the Manchurians, even this did little to humble the 
Chinese because both of these groups attempted to become Chinese by compiling 
imperial histories that included themselves among the Chinese dynasties. 
This belief in the exceptional nature of Chinese culture went almost 
completely unchallenged until the arrival of European powers in East Asia during the 
early nineteenth century. The British victory over the Chinese in the Opium War of 
1840-41 resulted in the Chinese granting concessions to the British including British 
possession of Hong Kong. The Chinese felt that all of history was being repudiated, 
and things were about to get worse. Other colonial powers, observing British success 
in China, did not want to be left out. The French, Russians, Japanese, and others 
would act to exploit China throughout the rest of the century. In the first half of the 
twentieth century the Japanese would take on the role of major aggressor, demanding 
much more than the other colonial powers and ultimately taking over most of Eastern 
China. The Chinese response to foreign incursions was confused and divided. Only 
12 
with the triumph of the Chinese Communists in 1949 did China begin to reassert its 
position in the world. 
Under the leadership of Mao Zedong the idea of Chinese superiority 
reemerged in a new form. If the world did not acknowledge China's cultural 
superiority, China would demonstrate its worthiness by never again backing down 
from foreign challenges. In less than a year China was given the chance to back up 
Mao's claims. The Chinese claimed that the American drive up the Korean peninsula 
represented a threat to China and promptly entered the Korean War on the side of the 
faltering North Koreans, fighting the Americans to a draw. China then confronted the 
United States over the Taiwan issue in 1954 and 1958, invaded the border regions of 
India in 1962, and fought skirmishes with the Soviets over disputed borders in 1969. 
China had rediscovered its sense of superiority in a new form, military toughness. 
Case #1, The Cyprus Crisis of 1964 
The American attempt to deter a Turkish war against Greece over the Cyprus 
issue in 1964 is the specific decision within the pattern to be analyzed and compared. 
Although Russett and Huth identify Greece as the guardian state in this case, 
historical accounts clearly show that the United States played a more significant role 
in the effort to deter the Turkish invasion (Ball 1982: 350). Lebow and Stein do 
identify the US as the guardian state and believe it to be the most impressive of the 
three cases they identified as being successful immediate extended deterrence 
encounters. The US attempt to deter a Turkish attack on Cyprus (which conventional 
wisdom held would automatically trigger a war with Greece) came in the form of a 
13 
letter from President Johnson which declared that the United States would pull out of 
Turkey and expose it to Soviet invasion should Turkey initiate war over Cyprus. This 
communication, forever after simply known as the "Johnson letter," caused Turkish 
president Inonu to immediately cancel invasion plans. This was done even though 
the likelihood of Soviet attack was not imminent and the credibility of the American 
threat was not strong. One student of Turkish foreign policy has even gone so far as 
to term the Turkish fear of American abandonment a "nai"ve" decision (Celik 1999: 
xiii). However, it was only a nai've decision if Turkey believed that the US would 
really leave them unguarded in the face of a Soviet attack. Other concerns may have 
caused Turkey to decide not to strike against Cyprus. I am suggesting that Turkey's  
strong affiliation with NATO, a symbol of its affiliation with the West, was the 
deciding factor in Inonu's decision. For while many in Turkey were angered by the 
Johnson letter and angry at NATO, the Turkish government believed that leaving 
NATO would " . . .  slow Turkey down on her road toward the fundamental goal of 
becoming an equal member of the Western society of nations" (Vali, 164). 
Case #2, The Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 
The second decision to be analyzed is the unsuccessful Soviet attempt to deter 
the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979. Both Russett and Huth, and Lebow and 
Stein locate this case in the category of unsuccessful immediate extended deterrence. 
Like the American attempt to deter Turkish action against Cyprus, it involves a 
superpower playing the role of guardian state. During the late 1970s the Soviet 
Union and Vietnam began to establish friendlier ties in what was already a close 
14  
relationship. As Vietnam successfully invaded its western neighbors in Indochina, Laos and Cambodia (who received Chinese support), China began to feel that it was being encircled. The Chinese began to make noises about invading Vietnam, and the Russians and Vietnamese signed a Treaty of Friendship. The treaty did not stipulate definite Soviet intervention if Vietnamese borders were violated, but Soviet Premier Brezhnev did make it clear that this was a possibility that China must keep in mind (Gilks 1992: 218). According to simple power calculations, if Turkey gave in to American threats of removing NATO protection, China would definitely yield to a much more powerful contiguous state that could easily invade Chinese territory. Yet this was not the case. Conceivably, China had much more to lose than Turkey did for going its own way, but prior patterns of Chinese action led China to act in a contrary manner. This happened even though the Soviet nuclear force was vastly superior to the Chinese nuclear force and the fact that Soviet intervention would cause a two front war. Instead .of heeding the possibility of a Soviet response, Deng Xiaoping followed the Maoist procedure of striking at an enemy to demonstrate that China would not be cowed and bullied as it had been before 1949. Chinese foreign policy called for a much different way of dealing with stronger states than did the precepts of Ataturk to which the Turks adhered. As with the Turkish case, however, I will demonstrate that China's unique perceptions about itself and its place in the world led to the decision to undertake punitive action against Vietnam. Both cases fall into the period between the First World War and the end of the Cold War, and it is the nature of this era that I will analyze for its effects on the cultures and foreign policy decisions of China and Turkey. This historical delineation 15 
is borrowed from Huntington, who suggests that during this period " . . .  the conflict of 
nation states was supplemented by the conflict of ideologies, first among fascism, 
communism, and liberal democracy, and then between the latter two" ( 1996:52), and 
also Morgenthau, who finds that international relations after the First World War was 
characterized by a completely different moral climate than before the war ( 1963: 
259). There is little argument that the First World War was a watershed event in 
international relations (Miller 1994: 44). This study will show that the characteristics 
of that war and their effects on the international system initiated and sustained an 
environment that can be differentiated from other periods of history, and that these 
characteristics had a marked impact on culture and foreign policy decision making. 
Implications 
The implications of this study fall into three broad categories. First, as has 
already been suggested, this study can provide a model for overcoming the division 
between nomothetic and ideographic studies. Also, the model provides possible 
solutions to some of international relations theory's current problems regarding 
change and prediction. It does this by offering a way to integrate the cultural 
perspectives of specific states with the prevailing social characteristics of the 
international system. While there have been many calls for theory in both 
international relations and foreign policy studies to accommodate perceptual factors 
(Alker 1992; Haas 1997; Weber 1995), not many concrete proposals of models that 
would actually do this have been put forward. This model is one that could be 
employed for understanding and also predicting foreign policies of specific states. 
16 
The third implication of this study is that area and actor specific information is important and useful for the practice of foreign policy. While many international relations scholars have neglected the importance of area specific information, foreign policy practitioners disagree and disregard much of grand international relations theory because of the lack of emphasis on area specific factors (George 1993 : 130). By creating a model that heavily relies on actor specific information, it is hoped that foreign policy studies can be made more useful for foreign policy practitioners. More specifically, this study contributes to the general understanding of immediate extended deterrence and in what cases it will be effective. The immediate extended deterrence studies noted above (Huth and Russett, 1984; 1988; Lebow and Stein, 1988) focus on the actions and outlook of the defending party, not the attacking party. This study focuses solely on the perceptions of the attacking party. This is important for those practicing immediate extended deterrence (the defending party) because the effectiveness of a particular deterrence strategy is dependent on the intentions of the adversary against whom the strategy is undertaken (Axelrod 1984: 30). Without a particular understanding of how a potential adversary is interpreting the deterring signals it sends, a defending state is more likely to fail in its efforts to deter an attack on a friendly third party. This is particularly relevant to decision making in American foreign policy because of the US role as global superpower. Although foreign policy issues such as terrorism are increasingly important, much of American foreign policy involves preventing or moderating conflict in various regions of the world. As different crises arise, an enhanced understanding of a specific country's foreign policy orientation 
17 
may aid US officials in deciding which threats are more serious than others and 
whether diplomatic initiatives are likely to be successful or not. 
Outline of the Study 
The first chapter includes an introduction to cultural theories, immediate 
extended deterrence, methodology, and the cases to be considered. Both the second 
and third chapters deal with theoretical issues. The second chapter explains the type 
of cultural theory employed here. Issues such as the validity of cultural theory, the 
origins of cultures, and the ability of cultures to adapt to changing circumstances are 
addressed as well as several studies employing recent forms of cultural theory (Hunt 
1984; Sahlins 1985, 198 1). The third chapter justifies and explains the delineation of 
historical eras of international relations. The types of changes that transform the 
international system will be discussed, as will characteristics that are specific to 
different eras of international relations. Special emphasis is given to justifying the 
uniqueness of the period relevant to the cases in this study, which began with the 
coming of the First World War and ended with the conclusion of the Cold War. The 
characteristics of this period that are the most salient for the purposes of this study are 
the prevalence of international organizations, which gave the Turks a means for 
identifying with Western civilization, and the escalated violence during the twentieth 
century, which influenced Chinese methods of demonstrating Chinese greatness. 
The fourth and fifth chapters discuss the historical patterns in Turkish and 
Chinese foreign policy and the factors relevant to each. These will expand on the 
information provided above about Turkish and Chinese culture and decision-making. 
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Chapter Four considers the Turkish proclivity to submerge its foreign policy within 
Western international organizations during the time from the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic until the end of the Cold War within the context Turkish culture. 
Chapter Five considers the Chinese pattern of undertaking pre-emptive strikes 
against prospective enemies during the years between the establishment of the 
People 's Republic and the demise of the Soviet Union within the context of Chinese 
culture. Chapter Six provides a focused comparison of the Turkish decision to 
acquiesce to American demands that it not invade Cyprus in 1964 and the Chinese 
decision to rebuff Russian attempts to deter the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979. 
Chapter Seven will draw general conclusions from the earlier chapters, suggest 
possibilities related to Turkish and Chinese foreign policy, and state the implications 
of the study for general social science theory, international relations theory, and the 
practice of foreign policy. 
19 
CHAPTER II 
NEW CULTURAL THEORY 
AND FOREIGN POLICY The viability of culture as a factor in decision-making and political outcomes has been the subject of much discussion and debate both inside and outside political science. Political commentators often claim that leaders make certain decisions because of cultural influences without explaining what they mean by culture. A small minority of social scientists simply reject the idea that culture affects behavior, while many others who adhere to the precepts of behavioralism believe that culture is a factor affecting action but that it should not be studied because it cannot be adequately measured (Easton 1967). Others have attempted to demonstrate that culture is an important variable in explaining political outcomes, and they have done so with varying degrees of success. Several important political culture studies include Almond and Verba (1963), Inglehart (197 1), and Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990). Al�ond and Verba's  analysis of political culture in five different countries and development of a typology regarding national political participation was a significant contribution to the literature in comparative politics in that it was the first large systematic study of political culture. Although this study was similar to the present study in that it drew 20 
on theories from sociology and anthropology, it did not, as this study does, concern itself with how culture affects foreign policy. Also, the fact that the authors did not survey members of the lower class or women of any class in the five countries in question considerably weakened the viability of the study (Almond and Verba 1989). Inglehart makes an important contribution in that he demonstrates how changes in the industrial and economic environment within a national society over time affect the perspectives of different generations. His introduction of the concept of post materialism indicates very well the idea that changing circumstances can translate into changing values. However, he does not adequately explain how older forms of culture affected the more recent forms. The weakness of his work is summed up in Giddens' statement that, ''The current importance of discontinuist conceptions in social science and philosophy should not be allowed to obliterate the continuities that make discontinuity possible" ( 1979: 216). Rather than viewing culture from a national perspective, Ellis, Thompson, and Wildavsky maintain that culture can be better understood by viewing individuals as being members of one of four groups: individualists, hierarchs, egalitarians, or fatalists. They argue that all of these groups can be found in every country. No explanation of the importance of the cultural filters associated with national or ethnic groups is given. The central problem of this study is very different from the major shortcoming of Inglehart ( 1 971  ). Whereas Inglehart did not seek to account for past influences on culture because of his overemphasis on cultural change, Ellis, Thompson, and Wildavsky assume that culture completely determines the formation of preferences and does not change (Ellis 1993: 1 75). 21 
The present study is different from those mentioned above in both its area of analysis and its theoretical premise. As already related, this study is concerned with cultural effects on foreign policy, not political participation or public opinion on domestic issues. Nevertheless, the theory employed here attempts to overcome some of the problems mentioned above. Instead of ignoring the past as does Inglehart or being hopelessly bound to the past as do Ellis, Thompson and Wildavsky' s cultural groups, the theory employed here gives adequate consideration to both tradition and innovation. This will be discussed in later sections of this chapter. What immediately follows is a basic discussion of why humans have culture and how it affects understanding. This study claims that culture is an important factor in political outcomes because culture is the element that holds definable groups of individuals together. Because individuals work collectively to tame the environment, whether it be natural or social, in which they live, those within a cultural group feel bonded to one another through a common perception of their environment. Culture necessarily entails a common general understanding and outlook on life. This idea is summed up in the statement that, " . . .  there is a common core to learning how a society works, knowing how it works, and knowing how to change it. Central to all these is the fact that people are social, that they exist and act in relation to each other" (Carrithers, 20). Culture, then, is the system that humans use to operate in their environment (Triandis, 15). Humans begin to attain culture and understandings of the world colored by culture very early in life. This due to the fact that all humans have the inborn capacity to become cultural (Trevarthen 1983), and also that for infants the 22 
salient feature of their environment is other human beings (Carrithers, 57). The social world predominates from the first moment of consciousness. In other words, all humans begin life using socially constructed culture as a means for making sense out of their environments and continue to do so throughout their lives. Reality certainly exists, but it can never be perfectly understood by humans because they rely on cultural filters to understand reality (Charon, 6). Culture serves as a medium for organizing knowledge and experience. It provides the ability to categorize and discriminate. However, what culture cannot do is distinguish fact from myth (Mantovani, 2). This is why individuals from different cultures may have a difficult time communicating and arriving at common understanding on particular issues. The different histories that individuals from different cultures have experienced have imposed meanings on those individuals that makes complete cross-cultural understanding impossible. These differences are described in the statement that: Culture may be reflected in general tendencies of persistent preference for particular states of affairs over others, persistent preferences for specific social processes over others, and general rules for selective attention, interpretation of environmental cues, and responses. It is generally known that culture may provide detailed prescriptions (norms) for specific classes of situations while leaving other domains relatively unregulated. National and ethnic cultures are thus dis­tinguished in their degree of regulation of behavior, attitudes, and values, the domain of regulation, and the consistency and clarity of regulation and tolerance of other cultures (Tse, et al. 1988: 82). Symbols 23 
Symbols are a major component of culture because they are the means by which humans learn about and attain culture (Charon, 62). Symbols provide for common understanding by enabling people to understand themselves, each other, and the world around them (Geertz, 250). For the purposes of this study, a symbol may be defined as " . . .  any structure of signification in which a direct, primary, literal meaning designates, in addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary, and figurative and which can be apprehended only through the first" (Riceour 1974: 12-13). Symbols, then, retain and expand their meaning through their flexibility. Instead of losing their meaning when new circumstances arise, symbols undergo a process of reinterpretation. Symbols are a particularly important factor in maintaining national unity and identity over time. Only through symbols can citizens feel an attachment to one another and to the common past from which they have emerged. As the world changes national societies must change with it, but they must also retain some sense of what has gone before so as to preserve their distinctiveness and unity. Flexible symbols make this combination of transformation and continuity possible. They allow for confidence in the future of societies because they are: 24 . . .  the guiding stars of the timely existence of groups that facilitate for the group the stabilization under the sign of self-identity. A group feels itself strongly embedded in the world if it can trace its creation back into history and if really traditional and ancient movements can be coded into its symbols. Consequently we are faced with mythic devices which are considerably transformed under modem conditions (Csepeli, 69). 
These symbols take many forms. Obvious examples include national flags or anthems. More subtle forms include ideas, values, goals, and rules (Charon, 62). All of these are expressed in words and language, which are also symbolic. New Cultural Theory New cultural theory maintains that symbols and their interpretation are the essence of culture and that symbols are the only continuous element of culture. New cultural theory certainly makes allowance for the transformation of culture over time, but it argues that all changes are based upon some level of constancy. As events occur the context of action is changed, but some residue remains that affects what will happen in the future. Because symbols are flexible and may undergo reinterpretation, they simultaneously enable modified understandings and constrain the number of forms these understandings may take. New cultural theory seeks to overcome many of the traditional divisions within social science, attempting to show that the dichotomy between what Geertz (1973:  251) refers to as "epochalism" and "essentialism," or what might otherwise be referred to as history and anthropology, may not be justified. New cultural theory also looks to bridge the gap between nomothetic and ideographic research. Nomothetic science is based on three assumptions. (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 5-7) First, social science is capable of producing general statements by means of finding general patterns. Also, scientific theory should employ deductive logic. Finally, causal relationships can be derived by discovering spatio-temporal relationships between events. Ideographic research, by contrast, isolates a concrete 25 
unit of analysis and asserts that the internal dialectic of this unit is unique and cannot be found elsewhere (Galtung, 108). Because the premise of new cultural theory is that more general phenomena can only be interpreted through a local perspective, new cultural theory provides the possibility of overcoming the opposition between nomographic and ideographic research. Describing the role of those scholars who use the new cultural approach, Richard Biernacki writes that, " . . .  cultural analysts define the pragmatic contexts which symbols are employed for sake of revealing governing patterns that utilitarian manipulation or principals or adaptation to the environment do not readily explain" (69-70). Only by understanding social context can we understand what events mean in a particular society and why actions in that society take the form that they do. This does not mean that all action is irrational, only that all action has some basis in previous understanding (Foucault, 37). This implies that not only does past action modify understanding and affect present action, but also that present action will serve to modify action in the future. Cultural concepts accumulate meaning as they are used as guides to action over time. New cultural theorists serve to remedy one of the key problems in social science, the inability to account for how the past affects the present. No matter how fast a society undergoes change, change is still conditioned by the past. Rather than deprecating the role of the past, those wanting to understand social change must realize that only by first understanding what is continuous in society can social change be understood at all (Giddens, 7). 
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New cultural theory stems from Saussure's studies of structuralism and 
language. Structuralism is the defining characteristic of " . . .  theoretical perspectives 
which give primacy to pattern over substance. For a structuralist, meaning comes 
through knowing how things fit together, not from understanding things in isolation" 
(Barnard, 120). Saussure believed that the nature of language could only be 
understood by viewing how it was modified over time. Concerning language and 
change, he wrote, "What predominates in all change is the persistence of the old 
substance; disregard for the past is only relative. That is why the principle of change 
is based upon the principle of continuity" (Saussure, 74). 
All humans have the natural ability to learn and use language, but the learning 
of any particular language entails taking on a specific cultural outlook (Jahoda, 5). 
Existing language is constantly used to classify new concepts. In this way 
individuals' understanding of new developments in their environment is strongly 
influenced by the verbal categorizations that were previously in place (Leach, 33). 
The power of language to constrain understanding reflects the power of the social 
world to make meanings for individuals within that social world. 
Closely related to Saussure's study of language is Ricoeur's  ( 1974) study of 
the metaphorical quality of words. He claims that words have the characteristic of 
polysemy, meaning that words have the capability to take on new meanings without 
discarding older meanings. However, the number of meanings a word can acquire is 
not boundless because new meanings must find their place within the system of 
already existing meanings, thereby limiting the number and type of new meanings a 
word can attain. Describing the relation of words to events and the process that 
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brings them together, Ricoeur writes that, "In rising from system to event, in the 
instance of discourse, it brings structure to the act of speech .  In returning from event 
to the system, it brings to the system the contingency and disequilibrium without 
which it could neither change or endure; in short, it gives a 'tradition' to the 
structure, which, in itself, is outside of time"(95). 
Just as language systems and words simultaneously alter and endure, so do 
ways of thinking. Bourdieu's ( 1990) concept of the habitus illustrates how systems 
of thinking evolve. The habitus is a system for structuring experience that provides 
guidelines for organizing and comprehending information but do not necessarily 
provide reliable solutions to problems because of the limits of any structured system. 
The habitus is produced by shared perspectives of history and produces history for 
both individuals and societies at large. This is because the habitus is carried by each 
individual in the form of perceptual schemes that work to produce "correct" behaviors 
( 1990: 54), behaviors that conform to social expectations within a specific entity. 
The habitus is a constant force, and in part because of this it is hard to 
recognize. Things that change are easi ly noticed while those that remain constant 
may well be taken for granted. Social action is inexplicable from a purely rationalist 
perspective. Those who try to understand the world from a rational perspective will 
only account for immediate environmental changes and factors and as a result, be left 
wanting in their explanations. Only by comprehending both the habitus and 
environmental changes can social action be understood and appreciated. The habitus 
allows the mind to freely generate understanding within its constraints . It is similar 
to the mind of a developed artist who has spent years learning established methods 
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but then discovers a new form or style in that it takes what is already known and attempts to use this knowledge to interpret new developments (1990: 55). This does not imply that the habitus can account for everything, and information which directly rejects the thrust of a particular habitus is likely to be rejected by those who employ this habitus to understand the world. Because language, words, and the concept of the habitus are all related to and compose the symbols that give societies the ability to communicate and retain collective identity, they may affect political developments within a society or between societies considerably. This is the basic principle of new cultural theory. Two accounts of new cultural theory research are discussed in the following paragraphs, with particular emphasis on the second one as it is more closely related to the present study. Regarding domestic politics, Hunt (1984) demonstrates the ways in which symbols were appropriated by different groups during the French Revolution. The revolutionaries eventually adopted the female figure of Marianne on the seal of the republic in part because of her resemblance to the Virgin Mary, a historically familiar figure in Catholic France (1984: 93). While an opposing group of revolutionaries unsuccessfully attempted to put Hercules on the seal, in later decades socialist groups used a similar figure to represent the model worker (1984: 1 1 5). Both Marianne and Hercules gained legitimacy as symbols because of their ties to earlier symbols. As this study is more concerned with national identity and how it is transformed by the outside world, we now tum to an account of how influences from the outside world are interpreted by those within a state. 
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One of the key works in the field of new cultural theory is Marshal Sahlins' Islands of History ( 1985). In his account of Hawaiian culture and the Cook landing in Hawaii, Sahlins demonstrates how Hawaiians " . . .  put their concepts and categories into ostensible relations to the world"(1985: 149). Hawaii was like many other traditional societies, in that inevitably the Europeans came, but could only be understood by the Hawaiians as playing a part in their own indigenous legends. Hawaiians and their culture were subjected to interference from the outside world that could only be interpreted within existing cultural categories and yet also transformed those categories. What follows is a description of a Hawaiian cultural myth and the part that Cook and his men played in making this myth come to life. The Hawaiians traditionally celebrated the winter solstice with the New Year Festival of Lono, a god who returned every year during the period when the days began to get longer. During this period, known to the Hawaiians as the Makahiki, Lono came to the islands to retrieve his estranged wife who had since been captured by and married to the local king. As Lono arrived on the beach with his warriors, Hawaiian women would attempt to arouse Lono and the warriors by doing a seductive dance. (This was indeed the famous "hula" dance.) During the first fifteen days of the Makahiki, Lono symbolically takes control of the island districts one by one, setting the stage for a confrontation with the king on the sixteenth day of the Makahiki. On the morning of the sixteenth day Lono returns to the beach with his warriors and a mock battle ensues in which the king first suffers a mock death, but then returns from the dead to defeat Lono who is sacrificed a few days later. After the sacrifice the body of Lono is put on a raft and set out to sea. 30 
According to Sahlins the situation was one in which: 
the dynastic heroes, initially male and stranger-invaders, are neutralized 
and 'feminized' by the indigenous people. In the process, the people, 
originally the female reproductive cum earthly powers, are themselves 
transformed into a peripheral and protective masculine force. The 
transformations are mediated by the surrender of a native princess to 
the immigrant prince, which is alternatively the stranger's  fructifying 
marriage to the earth, hence the neutralization of his dynastic as the 
female descent of the native people (1990: xv). 
During January 1778, the time of the Makahiki, Captain Cook and his sailors 
and marines landed in Hawaii and disembarked from their two ships, the Resolution 
and Discovery. From the Hawaiian point of view it could only be Lono and his 
warriors coming from ocean. The women came to seduce Cooks' crew, and while 
Cook forbade his men to take up relations with the Hawaiian women, this order was, 
perhaps not surprisingly, disobeyed. Cook and his men stayed for a short period and 
received much hospitality from the Hawaiians with Cook himself being given all of 
the homage due Lono. Because they left before the Makahiki concluded, Cook and 
his men escaped the possible confrontation that awaited Lono at the close of the 
Makahiki. 
In November 1778 Cook returned to the Hawaiian islands. As he was arriving 
near the time of the Makahiki, the islanders again saw in Cook's return the coming of 
Lono. During this second stay in the islands, Cook realized the futility of his order 
concerning relations between the crew and Hawaiian women. While sexual relations 
between the crew and Hawaiian women were certainly not taboo as far as Hawaiian 
chiefs were concerned, other forms of contact between the two groups, such as eating 
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together, were a violation. The European men of the crew began to treat the women 
in ways that seemed completely normal to them, asking them to stay on the ship and 
having meals together. From the Hawaiian point of view this served to humanize the 
Europeans, making them seen all the more to be the warriors of Lono who lost their 
status as deities over the course of the Makahiki . 
Cook and his crew stayed in the islands until February 3 ,  1779. Having 
already overstayed the time of the Makahiki , prior to Cook's  departure the Hawaiians 
had begun an anxious line of questioning on the subject of when Cook would leave. 
When he and his ships did go, the Hawaiians were assured that the festival had 
reached its resolution. The fact that Cook was again departing was interpreted as the 
sacrifice of Lono. It seemed that the possibility of a real battle between the 
Europeans and the Hawaiians, the gods and the humans, had been eliminated. 
Tragically, in a little more than a week Cook was forced to return to the 
islands. The foremast of the Resolution was damaged in a gale on February 1 1 , and it 
and the Discovery made for Hawaii in order to repair the ship. The British sensed the 
uneasiness on the part of the Hawaiians but assumed that the Hawaiian chiefs and 
king would understand the mast problem. This hope was in vain. The Hawaiians 
believed that instead of submitting to defeat, Lono was now returning to replace the 
king. As Cook and his men reached the beach the islanders and their king met the 
Europeans in battle and Cook was fatally wounded. 
Cook's death fulfilled the Hawaiian's expectations, yet also forced them to 
evolve. After his death he and other Englishmen were identified with the Hawaiian 
gods. The Hawaiian kings became concerned with the behavior and customs of the 
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British royal family. When British sailors came to Hawaii , King Kamehamea asked 
them if he lived like George III. Sahlins characterizes this cultural evolution as a 
situation where: "By encompassing contingent events in received structures, 
perceiving mythical relationships in historical actions, the system appears merely to 
reproduce itself in a flexible way" (1985: 3 1). 
While the episode of Captain Cook and the Hawaiians is a very specific and 
dramatic account, something like this happens in all societies periodically. Every 
society has to confront new circumstances that are imposed on it from the outside 
world. Any given society can only react to these new circumstances by using its 
already developed categories of understanding. This reaction to outside influence 
will both maintain and change the cultural categories of understanding that are put 
into action. Also, whatever action is taken will also serve to change the general 
situation in the outside world. In other words, culture and circumstance continually 
cascade off one another. Both culture and circumstance are dependent variables 
causing " . . .  the devolution of the global forces to the terms of local action and 
conversely the expansion of local actions to global significance. It is thus half true 
that the event is a unique realization of a general structure. The other half is the 
realization of the unique event as a new general order" (Sahlins 1991 :81). 
Foreign Policy Studies 
The study of foreign policy is a relatively open subfield of study in that it 
borrows from and forms links between other disciplines. It has always drawn on 
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related fields, including international relations theory, theories of organization, psychological studies, and history, to name a few (Wright 1955). Also, many different influences foreign policy decision-making have been investigated. There has been strong interest in how organizational structures affect policy outputs. Allison (1971) demonstrated that it was difficult for the Kennedy administration to arrive at a rational solution during the Cuban Missile Crisis because of standing . bureaucratic processes and routines. Destler (1972) found that different American presidential administrations rely on different government departments for foreign policy advice because presidential confidence in individuals (not a specific department, such as state or defense) is the determining factor concerning whom the president consults while making a foreign policy decision. Another important focus of attention has been regime type. Oneal et al. (1996) argues that the combination of democratic government and liberal economic policies foster international economic interdependence, thus constraining leader's options related to the use of force in international disputes. Mansfield and Snyder 
( 1995), however find that while mature democratic governments are unlikely to initiate wars, states making the transition to democracy may be more likely to go to war than stable authoritarian governments. They believe that the extension of political power to masses of people who have scant democratic experience may mean that leaders are less capable of opting for peaceful solutions in international disputes. Related to these studies are those that examine the effect of public opinion and the media on foreign policy decision-making in democracies. Russett and Graham (1989) find that public opinion is not as volatile as was once believed and that public 34 
opinion increasingly constrains presidential decision-making. In a somewhat 
contradictory finding, Dietrich ( 1999) finds that interest groups only influence foreign 
policy decisions in minor ways. Concerning the media, Jakobsen ( 1995) argues that 
media encouraged foreign policy undertakings such as the Somalia operation are rare 
and that the national interest is still the overriding consideration of decision-makers. 
Attention has also been given to psychological and sociological factors and 
how they affect foreign policy decision-making. With regard to cognition, Herek 
( 1986) addresses the phenomena of leaders' interpreting information in ways that 
confirm previously held beliefs. M. Hermann ( 1979) analyzes the effects of stress on 
foreign policy decision makers. Janis ( 1982) finds that decision groups composed of 
people with similar opinions and social backgrounds may make less than optimal 
decisions due to an inability to search for alternative solutions. However, while 
foreign policy theorists have been happy to borrow from the schools of thinking and 
have analyzed the factors mentioned above and their influence on foreign policy 
decision-making, they have been somewhat reluctant to use cultural theories or focus 
on cultural aspects of foreign policy decisions (Hudson, 6). 
This is unfortunate because there is a strong case to be made for a relationship 
between culture and foreign policy. The few scholars who have undertaken the study 
of national style make this point. National style " . . .  may be understood as a nation's 
basic assumptions and beliefs about the world and its own role or place in it . . .  It 
affects perception, judgment, and modes of behavior on the international plane" 
(Krakau, 255). This means that each nation-state views the world differently based 
on its past experiences. Similar to the idea of national style yet more specific is the 35 
notion of strategic culture. Strategic culture refers to the idea that each state operates on the world scene in a unique way do to factors unique to that specific state. Instead of making the best choice when a decision opportunity arises as strict rational choice theorists assume, the leaders of a given state will make a less than optimal decision due to a "historically imposed inertia" that colors their perception of facts (Johnston, 34). National style and strategic culture can both be understood as being in keeping with the idea of limited rationality in that each argues that decisions are made from an incomplete perspective. The concept of limited rationality was certainly integral to the Sprouts' (1965) study of foreign policy and decision-making. Concerning decision making, the Sprout' s introduced the idea of the decision maker's "psycho-milieu," which consists of " .. . images or ideas, derived from some sort of interaction between what he selectively receives from his milieu (via his sensory apparatus) and his scheme of values, conscious memories, and subconsciously stored experience"( l 965: 28). This definition makes it plain that the world in which the decision maker lives can never be comprehended in its totality but instead is instead viewed imperfectly because vision is restricted by experience. The psycho-milieu, however, is an individual concept. It does not suggest to what extent national cultural attributes are part of leaders' environments and to what extent they affect leaders' abilities and outlooks when making decisions. Other important studies of foreign policy decision-making, while not providing detailed accounts of how domestic cultural factors affect decision-making have pointed to the importance of these factors. Jervis ( 1976) claims that decision-36 
makers are influenced by predispositions that are a product of their national societal perceptions (1976: 283). In their discussion of the setting for foreign policy decision­making, Snyder, Bruck and Sabin (1962) include the political attitudes of the population as an important determinant (1962: 68). George (1985) argues that all organizations " . . .  assimilate incoming information to preexisting images, beliefs, hypotheses, theories . . .  " (1985: 497). In their latest consideration of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison and Zelikow ( 1999), refer to the importance of national outlooks. While Allison and Zelikow are principally concerned with the relative strengths and weaknesses of the rational actor model, the organizational behavior model, and the governmental politics model, they also state that state level factors are important. In discussing the bounded nature of rational decision making, they claim that national attitudes are an important factor effecting decision-making, and that these attitudes will change over time. They state that if one were " . . . ignorant.. .of the differences between American national attitudes in the late 1990s and the mid- l 960s, or between the mid-l 960s and those of the mid­l 930s, fundamental factors in shaping the foreign policy of the United States would be overlooked" ( 1999: 390). Although this indicates that Allison and Zelikow believe that national attitudes change more frequently than the present study supposes, the more important point is that they believe that national attitudes constrain foreign policy decision-making and that these attitudes are apt to change. Allison and Zelikow, however, do not comment on the sources of national attitudes nor the reasons why they change. 37 
This study contends that national cultural attributes are a significant portion of leaders' environments and affect leaders' perspectives considerably. This is because the nation state is prominent in framing the way all citizens understand the world outside of it. According to Vertzberger: Societal attributes affect the nation' s  image of self and other actors in the international system. They act as guiding constraints on what policymakers perceive as possible, accountable, and legitimate range of interpretations and judgements. The attributes, which are formed in a process of socialization that policymakers are exposed to in the various stages of their life cycle and career, exist as generic frames of reference stored in memory and easily retrievable. They are well anchored, sometimes being unchallengeable and even unchangeable. Significant deviations from these collectively shared conceptual frames of reference may be penalized in democratic regimes through the electoral process or in nondemocratic regimes by the decline of public support for policies and possibly by the loss of power ( 1990: 261). While there will certainly be varied opinions within a state concerning the correct foreign policy of that state, there will also be a general understanding held by a majority of citizen's concerning that state's place in the world. Being a member of any particular national society entails the development of an us and them mentality, even among allies. A nation-state's  perceived place in the world, also known as its national identity, is directly linked to the way its citizens perceive the outside world. It " . . . can hardly be imagined without the feelings of trauma and pride that arise from external relations" (Dijkink, 11). National sentiments are rooted both in history and geography and the combination between the two (Lowenthal, 15). Ethnic or political 
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groups that remain intact over long periods of time can only survive by passing down stories and myths that give a community definition (Smith 1986: 208). The nationalism of many modem nation states cannot be understood without reference to the historical ties that it has which may extend back into antiquity (Smith 1999: 40). While the physical aspects of a state's geography may affect national identification to some extent, what is more important is the emotional attachment to places that the members of a society develop over time (Dijkink, 15). The violent conflicts of the past decade, in the former Yugoslavia and in Palestine in particular, have been a testament to this truth. The details of history and geography inform the foreign policy perspectives of the citizens living in a particular state. Perspective constrains action, and only by having knowledge about cultural perspectives can we understand why states act as they do. Foreign Policy and New Cultural Theory It is the purpose of this study to demonstrate that new cultural theory represents an important means for understanding foreign policy. While Sahlins' account of Cook and the Hawaiians is certainly related to foreign policy, as far as this author knows no specific study of foreign policy utilizing new cultural theory has been undertaken at the time of this writing. Earlier studies of national style have suggested that anthropological theory is a useful tool for comprehending the way a specific country sees the world and its role in it (Brown and Itzkowitz, 161). A more recent study of national style discusses the possibilities for using newer theories for understanding foreign policy and finds that, "Potentially more promising would 39 
appear to be the marriage of traditional foreign policy analysis to recent work in 
cultural anthropology" (Krakau, 255). That is exactly what this study intends to do. 
By showing how certain circumstances and norms began to dominate 
international politics during certain eras, this study will use new cultural theory to 
explain foreign policy outcomes. Instead of examining specific sets of 
circumstances' effects on specific societies, this study argues that by the early 
twentieth century a uniform international system that imposed similar constraints on 
all states had come into existence. It is the objective of the following chapter to 
explain the nature of the evolution of the international system and why specific 
features of the system were more important during certain eras. 
Undoubtedly factors such as the military and economic capabilities of a given 
state are important in comprehending that state's foreign policy. However, these 
factors are insufficient for explaining why states act the way they do in the 
international arena. This is because no state can assess its capabilities without 
viewing them through that state's cultural filter. Only by understanding the 
characteristics of a specific state's role in the world in tandem with the details of the 
global social environment of the time that form this cultural filter can foreign policy 
actions be completely understood. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE GLOBAL AND IDEOLOGICAL NATURE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The preceding chapter dealt with the idea of societal cultures and the impact 
that perspectives derived from these cultures had on the way that societies reacted to 
events. This chapter is concerned with the environment within which national 
societies operate, the international system. The main contention of this chapter is that 
the international system, at least by the early part of the twentieth century, had 
evolved beyond any specific European context and had become a generalized system 
which imposed conditions upon all of the world's states. While states approached 
their affairs with other states from unique perspectives, all states operated within a 
common environment that imposed constraints on state actions. Furthermore, this 
environment was not and is not permanent but is apt to change over time. 
During the twentieth century international relations were characterized by 
ideological conflict due to the influence of organizational and technological 
improvement just prior to and during the twentieth century. Following the Cold War 
ideology lost some of its global salience, and while it may be too early to understand 
the defining characteristic of the present era of international relations, it is not likely 
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to be a repetition of the twentieth century. Different periods of international history will have different characteristics that impose different constraints and offer different opportunities to states. While international relations scholars may disagree on the nature of international system, there is general agreement that the international system is a factor affecting the foreign policy of states. Traditional realists believe that the structure of the international system is necessary but not always sufficient in explaining most aspects of international relations (Kegley 1995: chapter 2). Neorealists, sometimes labeled structural realists, do not believe that the structure of the internationa_l system allows for prediction of specific foreign policy behavior but strongly assert that system is the salient constraint affecting the actions of states (Waltz 1997, 1995). Liberal international theorists (neoliberal institutionalists) find that the international system offers opportunities for cooperation and that international relations are going through a process of transformation due to political and economic modernization (Zacher and Matthew 1995: 108). While neorealists claim that the international system is an unchanging environment in which power is the only important characteristic (Waltz, 1979), this argument needs to be questioned. This is because: 42 To reduce all international politics . . .  to a 'struggle for power' is to beg as many questions as to provide answers for them. Developments in technology, economic processes, the expansion of the international system and the changing character of the state may have significant consequences on the structures and processes of international politics (K. Holsti, 5). 
Although political scientists have not demonstrated a widespread interest in 
dividing international relations into specific periods (Buzan and Little 2000), there 
have been some significant efforts in this area. Rosecrance (1963) argues that nine 
chronologically separate international systems existed during the time from the 
beginning of the eighteenth century through World War II He explains that each of 
these systems was marked by a different kind of diplomatic style (1963 :5). Luard 
( 1976), in a study that makes demarcations of international history similar to this 
study, argues that the international system experienced transformation in 1648, 1789, 
and 1914 and that these periods were dominated by different ideologies. In his 
description of the international social dynamic that dominated the era from World 
War I until the time of his writing, Luard states that: 
. . .  domestic societies were preoccupied by concern over different 
political ideologies. These rivalries and differences were reflected 
in somewhat comparable rivalries and differences between states 
within the international society as a whole. So the concern with 
the ideology became in a sense the "ideology" of the wider society 
too . .  . In such a situation interstate and intrastate conflicts become 
merged, and each state may expect to find supporters (because they 
are supporters of the same ideologies) within the territories of other 
states ( 1976: 69). 
Furthermore, this idea has been suggested and accepted by prominent scholars 
in international relations. With reference to the specific period which this paper 
concerns itself, Hans Morgenthau finds that before the First World War a "system of 
supranational ethics" existed that disappeared after the war [( 1948) 1963 : 258,259]. 
The destruction of this supranational ethic, according to Morgenthau, was the 
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elemental reason behind both world wars and the terror and intensity of the Cold War 
(Lebow 2001). Also, Samuel Huntington's ( 1996) work concerning the dominating 
influence of cultural conflict in the post-cold war era is squarely based on the idea 
that there are different periods of international history. 
What follows is a discussion of historical events with which most readers are 
already familiar. It is necessary to include an account of these events because they 
demonstrate the unique social environment of the international system during the 
years between World War I and the end of the Cold War. This is required in any 
study of a specific international system, because, "The goal inherent in the study of 
international systems is not simply to describe the attributes of particular systems but 
to link those attributes to things that transpire within the system" (Zinnes, 1 8). A 
secondary goal is to show how and why the international system undergoes social 
transition. The only way to do this to is recount the events that demonstrate the 
effects of the system on international relations generally and the foreign policies of 
specific states. 
Before 1914 
While the world is constantly changing, there are certain times when the pace 
of change accelerates to a level that differentiates these times and establishes them as 
dividing lines in history. Such is the case with the First World War. The end of the 
nineteenth century witnessed major changes in ethical and philosophical ideas, but 
these changes were largely confined to the intellectual world. Only with the coming 
of the war did these ideas gain common currency among the mainstream population. 
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Accompanying the changes in thought were rapid changes in technology. These changes made the recently impossible commonplace. Again, many of these new machines and devices were invented in the years that preceded the war, but it was the war and the search for technological advantage that it naturally involved that gave increasing numbers of people experience with these new creations. What is more, the war not only forced modem thinking and inventions on the populations of the traditionally affluent countries of Europe but also transmitted these ideas and experiences to the rest of the world. This combination of evolving thought, dizzying technological advancement, and global permeation of events marked a new era in history generally and in international relations specifically. No period of history can be adequately comprehended without an understanding of what preceded it, and the First World War is no exception. During the decades before the war the European world experienced drastic changes in thought and technology, but these changes were not immediately accompanied by political and societal change. After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 relative peace existed in Europe. Trade and technological advancement brought unprecedented economic growth for most European countries. While there was a certain amount of wrangling among the leading countries over colonies in Africa and Asia, there was confidence that professional diplomats would keep the soldiers in check and that disputes would not get out of control (Craig, 10). The prevailing view was that Europe was " . . . heading for a kind of high plateau, full of a benign progress and more abundant civilization, in which the benefits of modem science and invention would be more widely diffused, and even competitive struggle worked out 
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somehow for the best" (Palmer 1957 : 660). Even as late as the summer of 1914 there was general agreement that war was impossible due to the general prosperity that was largely based on international trade and cooperation (Keegan, 10). Despite the relative peace and optimism during the late nineteenth century, a number of developments simultaneously contributed to a growing uneasiness among the citizenry of Europe. While scientific discoveries seemed to suggest almost unlimited new possibilities for progress, these discoveries also brought into question so much of what had been taken for granted concerning the nature of man and the universe. Certainly Darwin' s writings had begun to undermine the Christian creationist consensus in Europe. The philosophical underpinnings of European society were further shaken by scientific insight into the limitlessness of the uni verse, the composition of the atom, and the discovery that instead of being fixed in space, stars were in constant motion. In this new world, " . . .  there could be no reality, no fixed point from which man could understand the cosmos in which he lived" (Mosse, 289). Not only did science jeopardize man 's  understanding of his place in the universe, it also had the potential to bring about economic dislocation, as increased mechanization began to cause more unemployment in some sectors of the economy (Mosse, 284 ). The resulting uneasiness provided fertile ground for the growth of new ethical visions. Certainly among the most important of these were the Nietzschean concepts of will to power and the superman. Nietzsche advocated that those men who had power should use it as they saw fit and not be constrained by any prevailing general concept of morality. Indeed, concerning these individuals, Nietzsche believed that, 46 
''Their superman-like quality lay not only in their genius, but in their freedom from 
scruples. What they did was right not because sanctioned by any law beyond 
themselves, but because they did it. So the Superman will be a law to himself'(Perry, 
170). In other words, one should seize any opportunity for self-aggrandizement and 
be skeptical of any moral code that might forbid him these opportunities. In spite of 
this change in the intellectual undercurrent, most people still believed that the 
international norms that had prevented war in the nineteenth century would continue 
to do the same in the twentieth century (Kohn, 42). 
While most in the prewar era most failed to realize the wider implications of 
the immense changes that were taking place, the erosion of rational ideals in 
philosophy in combination with the increased technological capability for 
organization and destruction had implications for the nature of international conflict. 
Key among the important technological advances in the late nineteenth century were 
the improvement of railroad systems, the development of heavier artillery, and the 
machine gun. These allowed armies to mobilize much more quickly and kill much 
more effectively. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 demonstrated that warfare had 
reached a new level of brutality, but the limited size and scope and geographic 
remoteness of this war prevented it from causing a new general understanding of the 
nature of war. Thi s did not happen until a decade later with the beginning of First 
World War. In the words of one historian the war " . . .  provided a preview of the 
Pandora's box of evils the linkage of science with industry in the service of war was 
to mean" (Baldwin 1962: 159). 
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The war itself was initiated not so much because the opposing forces had 
concrete war aims but because of a climate of rivalry and fear that had progressively 
developed in Europe since the tum of the century. After achieving unification in 
1870, Germany became industrially and militarily the strongest state on the European 
continent , yet it had almost no territorial possessions outside Europe. Though the 
Germans had decisively defeated the French in the Franco-Prussian War, the French 
still retained a large colonial empire in Africa and Asia. Great Britain, of course, had 
a more extensive colonial empire than that of the French. Whereas the French felt 
some degree of discomfort due to their geographic position vis-a-vis Germany, the 
British were relatively unaffected initially by the rise of Germany because of the 
English Channel and the undisputed superiority of the Royal Navy. However, shortly 
after 1900 the Germans embarked on a plan of naval expansion that the British 
interpreted as a direct threat to their interests. From this moment on all countries in 
Europe began to develop diplomatic and military contingency plans for war. Secret 
alliances were concluded and mobilization plans were perfected. In effect , any small 
incident could start a chain reaction that would cause all of Europe to plunge into 
conflict. 
World War I and the Coming of International Ideology 
The assassination of an Austro-Hungarian royal in Sarajevo in the summer of 
19 14 by a Serbian nationalist proved to be the spark that set off the explosion. 
Serbia's ties to Russia brought Russia and Austria-Hungary into conflict and all of 
their respective allies with them. Germany was allied to Austria-Hungary and France 
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to Russia, so Germany put the Schlieffen Plan, a plan for the mobilization of armies against France that had been developed more than a decade before 1914, into action in August 1914. The nature of the Schlieffen Plan, with its activation of reservists and strict railroad timetables, meant that once enacted it could not easily be halted. Once in motion, the forces could not be turned back. Although the Schlieffen Plan was successful in the early stages, German hesitation and the successful French and British counterattack on the Mame River led to stalemate. With the failure of the Schlieffen Plan to bring a quick German victory over France, the opposing Triple Entente and Central Powers armies resorted to digging trenches after the Battle of the Mame in a supposedly temporary effort to maintain battle lines and regroup. Instead of being a temporary arrangement, these trenches would mark the "Western Front," the battle line for the majority of the next four years. During that time, both sides used any and all means to break the lines and the will of the enemy. As each side attempted frontal assault after frontal assault only to be repulsed by the defending force, the true power of the machine gun began to be understood and casualties mounted. The frustration resulting from the lack of movement spurred the development and subsequent employment of new weapons such as mustard gas and the tank. As important as the developments on the Western Front were, they were superceded in importance by measures that the opposing militaries took to bring the war home to their enemies. Leaders reasoned that the stalemate on the battlefield might be broken by attacking lines of supply and terrorizing civilian populations. The differentiation between civilian and combatant that had existed before 1914 was 49 
shattered when dirigibles began to bomb cities and submarines fired torpedoes into merchant ships (Craig 1967: 13). Whereas before most civilians had the privilege of remaining physically and mentally detached from the horror of war, now they were constantly under threat. This had the effect of hardening civilian public opinion in favor of the war, and bolstered by government propaganda efforts, civilians began to view the enemy as thoroughly evil and were loathe to consider anything less than a complete victory over their dreaded foes (Craig 1967:14). Although the war had begun as a conflict between armies, it rapidly developed into a conflict between societies involving every citizen of the countries at war. The concept of total war had come into its own. By 1917 the original war aims of both the Allies and the Central Powers were largely forgotten. So much blood and treasure had been spent for so little return, that the reasons for going to war in the first place seemed ridiculous. Yet this is the very reason that each side continued to fight. After spending so much, how could government leaders tell their respective citizenries that they were now giving up, effectively making the years of fighting worthless? Some rationale for sustaining the fight had to be offered. It was under these circumstances that ideology in its modem sense came into being. Rivalry and maintenance of the European balance of power were the reasons that motivated the Allies to go to war in 1914. They certainly had not gone to war with the goal of bringing freedom to repressed and conquered peoples or establishing democratic governments in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, after more than three years of combat it was for these ideals that the British, French, and now the Americans 50 
claimed to be fighting (Mayer 1959: 368). As the Western democracies increasingly demonized Germany, they correspondingly began to feel that it was their mission to save civilization itself (Kennan 1961 : 5). The combined advocacy of European Socialists and President Woodrow Wilson championing the " . . .  rights of small nations, popular control of foreign policy, control of armaments, and international organization . . .  " seemed to offer the correct rationale for enduring until the Kaiser and his hordes were finally beaten down (Mayer 1959: 39-40). The initial outline of one of the major international ideologies that would define the twentieth century was now beginning to take shape. The other major ideology that began to attract strong international interest during the close and aftermath of the war was communism. While Marxist and socialist parties had existed throughout Europe in the decades before the war, none of the national governments on either side went to war with goal of making the world more receptive to international communism. However, by 19 17  Imperial Russia had been experiencing revolutionary pangs for more than a decade. Encouraged by the abysmal failure of Russian armies in Eastern Europe, socialist groups in Russia successfully deposed Czar Alexander and began fighting among themselves for power. Eventually, Lenin and his Bolsheviks emerged as the rulers of a new Soviet Russia. The Bolsheviks negotiated a peace treaty with Germany and exited the war. While the Russian revolution was unquestionably a brutal affair, it represented another vision of hope for war weary countries. Lenin's short-term objective was the destruction of capitalist class in Russia involving whatever means necessary, but " . . . his ultimate objective of the classless society in a warless world has the same 51 
hopeful and utopian quality as Wilson's search for a peaceful community of sovereign democratic nations of unequal power" (Mayer 1959: 393). Each of these ideas represented a way to overcome the feverish nationalism that led to war. As the war dragged into its fourth year, new visions for the postwar world had manifested · themselves. With the failure of the German offensive in the spring of 1918 and the renewed strength of the Western Allies due to reinforcement by the American Expeditionary Force, the Allies finally broke the German line. In November of 1918 the German government sued for peace and the war came to a close. Wilson, and the leaders of the other major victorious powers, George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, the so-called Big Four, came to Versailles in hopes of creating a postwar environment that would discourage a repetition of the World War. At the same time, communist parties began to spring up in the defeated countries. The conclusion of the war represented a new world situation for both the victors and the vanquished. Not only the Russian and German empires, but also those of the Ottomans and the Austro-Hungarians had vanished from the map. The total number of combatant and civilian casualties on both sides amounted to some fifteen million. Though armies were no longer in the field, Europe would not quickly find peace and equilibrium for some time. During the years after the war a disarray existed which led: 
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. . .  on the one hand, to utopian expectations of a total renovation of life out of the primary or primitive forces of race, or out of a world purged of corruption and decay. The very chaos of the postwar era 
was to give birth to a new cosmos which would justify the sufferings 
of the war. The same distress produced, on the other hand, a deep 
pessimism, the discovery of the new meaningless of life, of history, 
and of civilization (Kohn 1967:36). 
By undermining the norms of civilization that had existed before 19 14, the war made 
common understanding of the irrationalism that had existed only in intellectual circles 
before the war (Roth 1967:33). In the words of George Kennan, the indirect genetic 
and spiritual effects of the war " . . .  penalized victor and vanquished in roughly equal 
measure, and . . .  the damage they inflicted, even on those who were nominally the 
victors, was greater than anything at stake in the issues of the war itself' ( 1961  :9). 
The international ideologies that manifested themselves in 19 17, Wilsonian 
liberalism and communism, now were viewed as the two viable ways of dealing with 
the problems of the postwar era. Wilson's most important idea was the League of 
Nations, which posited that through international cooperation and collective security 
the threat of future world war could be averted. The League represented a significant 
departure in the history of international relations because it was the first organization 
to give legal status to certain ideas about international conduct and also because it 
was the first to acknowledge that states increasingly shared interests that would be 
more effectively pursued under a centralized, international organization (Armstrong, 
Lloyd, and Redmond, 32). 
The League was only one outcome of the war that indicated the end of the 
supremacy of Europe and the initiation of a truly international system. The League 
granted formal legal equality to smaller states in Europe and those outside Europe 
with the European powers, something that had never occurred before the war 
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(Brucan, 152). However, in granting non-European states memberships in the League, the League played a role in internationalizing some European norms. Foremost among these was the idea of the modem nation-state (Tambiah, 124), which many of the political entities that emerged from the form empires of Eastern Europe adopted. Throughout the rest of the century all states became organized on this principle. Finally, the war had demonstrated that ideology was integral for the mobilization of an entire national citizenry (Cassels, 138). To compete and survive in international politics in the twentieth century national leaders had to become affiliated with and espouse some sort of ideology. The two most important ideologies, Wilson's liberal internationalism and Leninist Marxism further internationalized the nature of the post World War I era because: In many ways the most significant feature both of Wilson's Programme and of Lenin's is that they were not European centred but world embracing: that is to say, both set out to appeal to all peoples of the world, irrespective of race and colour. Both implied a negation of the preceding European system, whether it was confined to Europe or whether it spread (as it had done during the preceding generation) over the whole world (Barraclough, 1 2 1 ) . It is not surprising that the bearers of these ideologies immediately came into conflict following the First World War. The Western Allies sent armies to Russia to assist the enemies of the Bolsheviks that were still actively resisting the establishment of the Soviet Union. While the Western effort to destroy communism in its infancy was a failure, it both demonstrated the nature of and set the tone for all international relations for the next seventy years. Great Britain, the United States, and others sent 54 
armies to fight against a newly established state that had been ravaged by war and revolution and, thus, had little power to threaten the victors of the First World War. Ideology was the prime motivation for this action, and it initiated the mutual hatred between the capitalist democratic West and the communist East that was to color international relations for the better part of the century. This has led one scholar to declare that conflict in post-World War I Russia marked the beginning of the Cold War (Schuman, 79-80). From this point on ideology would be a major influence on the foreign policy calculations of states. The Fascist Challenge One other integrating influence of war and its aftermath was the global economic system. The new international economy and its implications were very much related to ideology. The Versailles Treaty and the reparations that it contained served to increase the interdependence of the world economy. While it seemed that most, if not all, European countries would adopt some form of parliamentary government in the years immediately following the war (Berman, 4), postwar economic instability caused among other reasons by Germany's inability to pay its war indemnity brought the wisdom of the democracy, capitalism, and collective security advocated by the victors of World War I into doubt in many countries in Europe and elsewhere. The withdrawal of the United States from European affairs and the half-hearted efforts of the British to become involved in solutions to the economic problems of the period also did little to help. As many countries slipped into economic despair, the indispensability of ideology in forming party and platform 55 
continued to assert itself, and leaders in opposition to free market capitalism 
advocated either Marxist or fascist solutions to their countries ' problems. The 
twenties and early thirties were marked by civil conflict, sometimes violent, among 
social democratic, Marxist, and fascist parties. 
As the Great Depression illustrated the weakness of the democratic and 
capitalist systems, it to a significant degree opened the door for fascist extremists in 
Italy, Germany, and Japan, to take power (Mallia-Millanes, 42). Of course, the third 
ideology spawned by World War I, fascism, did not have an international appeal but 
rather was overtly based on the supreme affirmation of nationalism. Although 
lacking in international appeal and largely discredited after the Second World War, 
fascism was similar to communism in that it promised salvation by giving immense 
power to a single party under a strong leader. The totalitarian aspect of German and 
Italian fascism and Russian Bolshevism was similar in that the war had so utterly 
destroyed previous norms and institutions of government that the populations of these 
countries were ready to accept dictatorial leadership (Friedrich, 1967). Because of 
fascism's  hostility to the international visions posed by the two predominant world 
ideologies it was inevitable that it would come into conflict with them. However, the 
countries that represented the two opposing major international ideologies each hoped 
that the fascists would serve to eliminate their enemy. This meant that the fascists 
would have an opportunity to terrorize much of the world before the democracies and 
communist Russia came together in common effort to oppose them. 
By the mid-1930s fascist regimes in Italy and Germany had consolidated 
power and were looking for allies. They found one in Spain' s General Francisco 
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Franco, who had initiated civil war by trying to overthrow the democratically elected 
Popular Front Government in July 1936. Although the Republican Popular Front was 
democratic, it had as its mission the reconciliation of Western democracy and Russian 
communism (Deutscher, 422), and it was largely distrusted by the Western 
democracies. The British, in particular, feared that if they supported the Spanish 
Republican government it might lead to communist gains elsewhere in Western 
Europe (Mallia-Milanes, 93). Stalin, however, eventually felt compelled to intervene 
in support of the Popular Front because it had become increasingly identified with 
international communism (Ulam, 244). The failure of the British to intervene was 
interpreted in Moscow as being in support of fascism and in opposition to the Soviet 
Union (Taylor, 125). While Stalin did not commit materiel and men to the Popular 
Front to the extent that Hitler and Mussolini contributed to Franco's fascists, the very 
fact that the leading fascist and communist powers had become involved in a 
supposedly civil war demonstrated the surging influence of ideology on international 
relations. Whereas during the preceding century the European powers consulted 
each other during crises with the objective of limiting conflict, now for reasons of 
ideology leaders attempted to expand conflict. 
In addition to the democratic countries' decision to ignore the threat of 
fascism on the Iberian peninsula, Britain and France achieved what amounted to a 
cancellation of their promise to defend Czechoslovakia by allowing the Nazis to take 
the Sudetenland in 1938.  This instance of appeasement of fascism removed all doubt 
in Stalin's mind concerning whether the western European democracies were turning 
a blind eye to fascism in hopes that it would destroy Soviet Russia. When in August 
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1939 Hitler sent his foreign minister to meet with Stalin with the goal of negotiating a 
non-aggression pact, " . . .  it is probable that he (Stalin) saw the Soviet-German Pact as 
a convenient device by which he could divert Hitler 's aggressive dynamism in the 
opposite direction" (Liddell-Hart, 14). For a period of almost two years the Nazis did 
indeed direct their might against France and Great Britain, but, inevitably, Stalin's 
hopes that Germany would be content to destroy democracy in Western Europe and 
no more were shattered when Hitler turned his forces eastward against Russia in the 
summer of 1941. 
The growth of fascism had been encouraged not only by the nonintervention 
of western democracies in the Spanish Civil War and Czechoslovakia in 1938, but 
also by the failure of the democratic powers to intervene on behalf of China when 
Japan had invaded Manchuria in 193 1 and the failure of the League to deal forcefully 
with Italy when it invaded Ethiopia in 1935. During 1939 and 1940, fascism made 
significant gains as Hitler overwhelmed most of Europe and the Japanese ran rampant 
in East Asia. 1941 ,  however, was to be the turning point because this was the year in 
which the fascists overstepped. In the past, whether by plan or happenstance, the 
fascist states had been successful because the forces of democracy in the West and 
communist Russia were divided. The German attack on Russia and the Japanese 
attack on the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor served to unite the West and 
Soviet Russia in an ultimately successful effort to destroy fascism. 
The Second World War deepened the trends that were initiated during the 
First World War. The war aims of the states that fought the First World War were 
vague and only evolved into ideological aims in the latter part of the war. The Second 
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World War began on the other hand (although it must be said that it began at different times for different states) with a clear ideological mission on the part of the Western European powers, the US and the USSR: to rid the world of fascism. The reason that it did not begin earlier was that both the capitalist democracies and the Soviet Union hoped that the fascists would destroy the other. In other words, not only the decisions during the war, but also those made in the decade preceding the war were strongly influenced by ideology. Also, while World War I involved participants from many countries outside of Europe, most of the fighting was confined to Europe. The Second World War was truly a global conflict in that Asia, Africa, and all of the world's oceans were theatres of major conflict. The Cold War and Increasing Ideological Conflict The coalition of allies that came together to defeat fascism was to endure only as long as the war itself. Even before the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945 the Western Allies and the Soviet communists had begun to renew their suspicions of one another. With the threat of fascism successfully extinguished, the ideological conflict between Western Europe and Soviet Russia that had existed before the was quickly renewed. The Western powers along with the Soviets occupied Germany and soon thereafter fell into disagreement about the disposition of a future German state, eventually resulting in a divided Germany. Rather than pulling back from Eastern Europe, Stalin proceeded to set up communist governments in Eastern European states that were loyal to the Soviet Union. Within five years of war's end, the Soviets had successfully exploded an atomic bomb, the Western allies had formalized their 59 
common defense of Western Europe with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and 
as a result the battle lines of the Cold War had been drawn. 
During the years between the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin 
Wall ideological conflict was the dominant motivating factor in international 
relations. The Western Allies, and particularly the United States, commenced 
offering economic and military aid to countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and 
the Middle East in hopes that these countries would embrace democracy, trade, and 
collective security and shun communism. The Soviet Union offered aid to counter 
western influence. The major hot wars of the period, in Korea, Vietnam, and 
Afghanistan, all had strong ideological elements. It is hard to see why the United 
States would have intervened in Asian conflicts in countries that did not have 
resources or traditional relationships with the US unless ideology was the motivating 
factor. While one could certainly argue that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan might 
have been undertaken by a Russia that was not Communist, again it is difficult to 
understand why the United States would have given aid to Afghanistan for any other 
motivation than ideology. Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of 
ideological conflict, did the United States cease giving aid to Afghanistan. Similarly, 
it is unlikely that the Soviets would have been interested in Cuba had it not been for 
the ideological conflict presented by the Cold War. The Cold War caused nearly 
every country to move towards one of the two major ideologies and plan their foreign 
relations accordingly. Countries that had somehow avoided ideological attachment 
and conflict before World War II were increasingly drawn into an ideological 
environment that offered only two choices. 
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Following the Second World War militant Marxist ideology began to be embraced by many countries outside of Soviet control and gained many adherents in the developing world. As postwar decolonization ensued in Asia and Africa, newly independent governments and those who were not yet independent but were anxious for independent status found it necessary to organize under the mantle of a recognized ideological framework. Inevitably, many of the groups in the developing world struggling to gain or consolidate independence turned to communism. This was not necessarily because of a belief in the correctness of orthodox Marxism. Rather, according to George Kennan: . . .  the power of Communist inspiration would prove to reside not in anything essential to the structure of Marxist thought, but in the infectious example of a political movement successfully contemptuous and defiant of old Europe; in the identification of the Marxist slogan of imperialism with the national and racial resentments of peoples emerging from colonialism in many parts of the world; in the political fascination inevitably radiated by any effective despotism in an age of change and uncertainty; in the inacceptability, to many ruling groups, of the liberal freedoms of the West; and, finally, in a pervasive illusion that the devices of Communist dictatorship in Russia represented a short cut, available to any people, to the glories of industrial and military power ( 1961: 8). Once independence had been established and political control legitimized, new communist governments would interpret and practice communism according to their own indigenous forms (Halberstam, 339). This does not mean that communism was merely a fa�ade and had no ramifications for government procedure and policy in the developing world, but that communism was a contemporary vehicle for expressing 61 
more traditional national ideas and sentiments. Only by understanding communism and local custom in tandem were policy and action made and only by understanding these two influences in tandem can policy and action be understood. This was also true of the states that chose democracy and collective security. Whether strong state states or weak ones, each state attempted to work within the international organizations in which it held membership to advance its own interests. While member states might aspire to the ideals of western civilization and liberal ideology, understanding of these concepts was always viewed through the prism of states' individual historical experiences. The situation of collective security and regional defense organizations was similar to that of the United Nations in that " . . .  many member states were conditioned to view the United Nations as an instrument for the advancement of their exclusive policies" (Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, 
3). The First World War initiated the overturning of the international social order. A loosely integrated international order ruled by European colonial powers was replaced by a more tightly integrated world order that was presided over by two strong states, both partially but neither completely European, that championed opposing ideologies. One author, describing the confrontation between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites and the United States and Western European states claims that, 
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Ideological patterns, whether arising from the communist world or from the West and America, proffered blue prints to give form to a new international order. The pluralist West devised numerous 
patterns and variations on the democratic idea, Soviet Russia proffered 
one. Yet in each case ideology proposed patterns to undergird or 
legitimize new order (Seabury, 100). 
In a wider sense this description describes not just postwar Europe but the entire 
international system during the twentieth century. The new order was a social system 
that limited state options concerning the general form of government that they would 
choose. All states with the exception of a few monarchies and sultanates chose one or 
other of these two all-encompassing visions that were fostered by the First World 
War and increasingly dominated international politics during the twentieth century. 
Certainly, there were states that tried fascism or nonalignment, but nearly all of these 
states eventually moved toward one camp or the other. That there were at times 
major divisions within each movement was only natural. For each state that 
professed either of these international ideals could only do so to the extent that they 
understood them. No two states could have identical understandings of outlooks that 
were as broad and malleable as these. What is more, understanding of ideology was 
unlikely to be greater than the reason for choosing a particular ideology, and the 
reason that motivated choice of ideology was none other than the " . . .  accommodation 
of the one omnipresent and thriving ideology, that is to say, nationalism" (Cassels, 
180). 
Nationalism, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, is always to some 
extent a product of national culture. Indeed, the two can never be completely 
separated. Chapters IV and V will show why and how two very different national 
societies opted for a different international vision during the twentieth century and 
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also how the two ideologies provided a means of evolution for the two societies' national cultures. Just as the foreign policies of the major powers were strongly affected by the ideological nature of the international system, so were the foreign policies of Turkey and China. Turkey and China immediately experienced new circumstances following the First World War. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire forced the Turks form an independent state, but, unlike many of the new states that gained independence during the twentieth century, Turkey sought membership in the Western community. The reason for this was that the Turks had a cultural tradition of affiliating with the strongest civilization. The concept of Wilsonian internationalism provided Turkey with an opportunity to act out its traditional role of forming affiliations with states from an established civilization by joining Western international organizations. Membership in these organizations also constrained Turkey's foreign policy options during the twentieth century because Turkey placed such a strong emphasis on being a loyal member of these organizations. This, as will later be shown, was the overriding goal of Turkish foreign policy. This meant that the Turks often were willing to do more than most other member states to demonstrate their loyalty to the organization, leaving Turkey vulnerable to manipulation by more powerful states within these organizations. Turkey was at a particular disadvantage vis-a-vis the United States because of Turkish overconfidence in both the nature of American friendship and in the strength of Turkish-American cooperation within NATO. China, on the other hand, was the heir to a completely independent civilization that had suffered at the hands of Western colonial powers for the better part of a 
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century. Up until the late eighteenth century China was easily the most influential 
state in Asia, and its methods of governance were admired the world over. However, 
by 1 800 Western states had moved far ahead of China economically, technologically, 
and militarily and Western states, particularly Britain and France, exploited their 
ability to extract concessions from China. China, once secure in its position as the 
cultural center of the earth, now was ravaged by Western merchants, missionaries and 
armies. China was largely passive in its attempts to halt Western intervention until 
the end of the First World War. Although uprisings against Western intervention in 
China, such as the Boxer Rebellion, did occur, these were the exception and not the 
rule. The coming of modem international ideology, however, presented the Chinese 
with an opportunity to revitalize their traditional role as the cultural center of the 
Eastern world and a great power by accepting and advocating revolutionary Marxism. 
This had important implications for Chinese foreign policy in that China had to 
portray itself as a revolutionary state committed to violent opposition to any foreign 
aggressor. 
These implications were represented by the PRC' s frequent initiation of 
border conflicts during the years between the establishment of the People's Republic 
in 1949 and the demise of the Cold War. During this time the Chinese had did not 
have a modernized military force and experienced periods of domestic social 
upheaval, but they still chose to pursue an aggressive foreign policy, initiating 
military conflict with both the United States and the Soviet Union. The sixth chapter 
will provide a focused comparison of how the relationship between specific national 
cultures and international environment affect Turkish and Chinese foreign policy 
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decision-making. By analyzing foreign policy decisions made by Turkish and Chinese leaders in situations of immediate extended deterrence, it is hoped that a deeper understanding of how national cultural and international social factors work in tandem to constrain foreign policy decisions. 66 
CHAPTER IV 
TURKEY AND THE WORLD 
DURING THE OTTOMAN PERIOD 
AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that Turkish foreign policy 
decision-making during the period from World War I to the end of the Cold War was 
influenced by a combination of traditional Turkish ways of dealing with the world 
and the international social environment during that period. This chapter thus 
provides the context for the examination of the Turkish decision in the Cyprus crisis 
of 1964. This specific case will be analyzed in detail in Chapter VI. Because the 
central idea of this research project is that culture affects decision-making, before the 
actual decision is discussed the cultural history that manifested itself in the decision 
of 1964 must first be related. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss or summarize all of the traits of 
Turkish culture and history. Rather, the objective is to illustrate the following points 
that are specifically related to this study. First, the Turks, unlike many national 
groups, have not been consistently identified with one civilization but have sought 
membership in different civilizations at different times. Second, because of their lack 
of identification with one civilization the Turks have a cultural need for affiliation 
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that was demonstrated in the role that the Turks played within the Ottoman Empire during the time between the tenth century and the First World War. Finally, after the destruction of the Ottoman Empire the Turks demonstrated their cultural need for affiliation by enthusiastically seeking membership in Western international organizations and doing more than was necessary to fulfill their obligations to these organizations. What follows is a description of Turkey's historical interaction with the world. Inherent in this historical account are certain patterns of interaction that are repeatedly demonstrated by the Turks and that represent the culture of Turkish international relations. First, the general pattern of Turkish action in the world before the First World War is described. Then, the specific manifestation of this cultural pattern during the period between the First World War and the end of the Cold War will be discussed. It is in this period that the Cyprus crisis falls, and, therefore, special attention will be given to this period of history. The argument here is that the salient feature of Turkish relations with the world is a desire to be affiliated with something larger than Turkey itself. This dominating facet of Turkish relations with the world has been demonstrated in the Turks' international actions during the last millennium and manifests itself in both a facile ability to cooperate with others and a marked insecurity about Turkey's place in the world. This aspiration has grown out of Turkish historical experience and the related factor of Turkish geography and has affected Turkish perception of other countries' intentions and of Turkey's own role in the international system. 68 
Several scholars have commented on modem Turkey's  identity problems, and 
they generally agree that these problems have developed because of the confusion in 
Turkish society concerning whether Turkey should be identified with Europe or with 
the Islamic world. Aspects of this problem include the ambiguous nature of Turkey's 
geographical position (Carley, 3), value conflicts within Turkey between groups that 
lean toward the West and those that strongly identify with the Islamic world (Mardin 
1998: 212), and the rapidly implemented policies of modernization and secularization 
introduced by Ataturk (Carley, 11-12). Modem Turkey's quest to understand its own 
identity has even been described as "schizophrenic" (Poulton, chapter 10). The point 
that will be made in the following paragraphs is that recent Turkish aspirations and 
identity problems are not simply an outgrowth of events in the twentieth century but 
part of a larger pattern spanning many centuries. 
Turkey manifested this behavior during the twentieth century by seeking 
inclusion in the Western community of states. The social environment of the 
international system during the period from World War I until the last decade of the 
century dictated that the way a country could become identified with a group of other 
countries was to gain entrance into international organizations of which these 
countries were also a member. For Turkey, a society that had historically sought 
affiliation with strong and established civilizations, the direction of their foreign 
policy was clear, the way to achieve this inclusion was to gain membership in 
Western based international organizations. Membership in these organizations and 
bilateral ties with Western states served not only Turkey's security and economic 
interests but also Turkey's  "psychological" interests (Birnbaum, 188). 
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Turkey and the World Before WWI The Turks have not always occupied the area of the present Turkish Republic, but instead have been a people who have lived in different areas at different times. Originating in central Asia just northwest of China, Turkish tribes began migrating westward during the middle of the first millennium A.D. Initially, these tribes did not migrate in unison. However, many of these tribes allied themselves together when attacked by the native inhabitants of the lands through which the Turks were passing (McCarthy, 3). It is possible that the Turks began this migration because of Chinese expansion. Regardless of the reason, this initial westward movement initiated a migratory instinct in the Turkish people. This penchant for migration involved a search for not only a homeland, but also social acceptance. In other words, physical dislocation led to social dislocation. Scholars have noted that Turkey is a "lonely" country due to her unique cultural history and geographic position (Volkan and Iskowitz, 190). Group responses to the environment produced social tendencies. The urge to overcome this sense of social dislocation manifested itself in Turkish attempts to become part of the most prestigious civilizations. While making temporary arrangements with many different groups, the Turks only sought to forge long lasting bonds with the strongest groups of states. This search for identity provided the Turks with much interesting experience. During their period of migration, many Turks accepted and most later relinquished a variety of religions. According to Berkes, the Turks have " . . .  passed successively 70 
through Shamanism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Manichaeism, and Islam, carrying traces of all these religions alive in their national culture" ( 1964: 50 1 ). During their period of migration before becoming part of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks made notable but impermanent relationships with the Greeks and Persians and integrated many various smaller groups into their own. In his study of pre­Ottoman Turkey, Cahen finds that the defining characteristic of Turkish culture during this period was the facility to enter into symbiotic relationships with other cultures, and with the Greeks and Persians in particular ( 1969 : 370) . Also during their period in Anatolia before becoming part of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks assimilated many of the earlier inhabitants of the region-including Hittites, Greeks, Armenians, Mongols, and Kurds-into their numbers (Hotham, 8). A recent archeological study has confirmed that the area of the present Turkish Republic has been either home or passage way for an extraordinary number of different ethnic groups, asserting that the relics of as many as fifty identifiable ethnic groups could be found in Turkey (Pope and Pope 1997: 19-20). All of these instances suggest that the Turks, for better or for worse, were not inclined to guard their identity by maintaining a distance from others but attempted to find their identity through entering into cooperative relationships with others. Nevertheless, as stated above, the majority of the relationships that the pre­Ottoman Turks made with other cultural groups were not enduring. Only with the rise of the Ottoman Empire did the Turks find a culture with which they could make a lasting relationship. Instead of being forced to convert to Islam, as were many other national and ethnic groups were (B. Lewis 1 955: 322), the Turks accepted Islam 
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because, in the words of Kemal Karpat, Islam gave the Turkish state "purpose" and "meaning" (1959: 3). Although the Turks were in part attracted to Islam because it was similar to other religions that the Turks had adopted in that it was monotheistic, " . . .  what must have had as least as much weight with the Turks who came over to Islam in such numbers during the tenth century was that acceptance of Islam automatically conferred citizen-rights in a vast and flourishing civilization" (G. Lewis 1974: 28). At the time the Ottoman civilization was vastly superior to its European counterpart in the areas of military capability, philosophy, science, material wealth, and manners (B. Lewis 1993: 8) . In other words, the Turks finally settled into a long-term relationship with the Arabs and Persians within the Ottoman Empire because it offered the opportunity of being included in an advanced civilization. The Turks asserted themselves within the Ottoman Empire by making strong military contributions and became the leaders of the empire. Many of the first Turks who came to the Middle East came as slaves who were specifically trained for military functions. Furthermore, because of the Turkish position on the frontiers of Islam, the Turks became experienced in the military arts, allowing them to gain stature within the Islamic world. Also, as much of the territory bordering the areas around the Islamic world was populated by people of Turkish origin, Turks who were already converted to Islam and committed to the expansion of the Ottoman Empire were well positioned to convert and thereby coopt people living on the Western borders of the empire. In 1055, the first strong group of Turkish Muslims, the Seljuqs, conquered Iraq, and within several years also overwhelmed the Syria and Palestine. In 1071, the Seljuqs defeated the Byzantines at Manzikart, a feat for which 72 
the Arabs had striven for in vain. This victory established Turkish leadership in what was becoming the Ottoman Empire. However, for all of the Turks' military success, they still looked to other members of the Empire for cultural identification. The Arabs were the original bearers of Islam, and the Persians brought a strong literary tradition to the Empire. It was to these cultural influences that Turks looked as much as their own (Pope and Pope, 14). This is evidenced by the fact that early Ottoman political documents were written in Persian (Kadafar, 61) and even the successful exploits of Turkish military heroes were related within the context of older Arabian military adventures (Kadafar, 63). Outside of their military prowess, the Turks made little contribution to the Islamic cause. In fact, from the time that the Turks came into control of the Ottoman Empire the cultural and economic life of the region went into decline (Bregel, 72). During the centuries of Ottoman strength, the Turks became increasingly integrated into the empire. The Turks were content to be identified with an Islamic civilization that was superior to that of Europe and at least equal with that of China. This was evidenced in the fact that the Turks " . . .  submerged their identity in Islam­to a greater extent than perhaps any other Islamic people" (B. Lewis 1955: 324). Also, the Turks saw themselves as the guardians of Islam and opposed differing interpretations of scripture and the growth of sects within the Ottoman Empire that resulted from disagreement over the meaning of the Koran (Adnan-Adivar 1951: 119). When circumstances began to change with the rise of European power during the seventeenth century, the Turks were not quick to give up their belief of Ottoman 73 
superiority (Berkes, 25). However, after the French Revolution and the Napoleonic 
Wars the growing strength of Europe was evident and the Ottomans attempted to 
reform their bureaucracy and military along European lines. Many Turks became 
exposed to European culture and were impressed with both its material and 
organizational success. This inspired several movements during the latter half of the 
nineteenth century in favor of more general reform of the Ottoman system. The most 
prominent of these movements were the "Young Ottoman" and "Young Turk" 
movements. Although these movements paralleled the nationalistic movements 
taking place in other countries during the period, the overriding goal of both Young 
Ottomans and the Young Turks was not to establish a separate Turkish state but to 
restore the Ottoman Empire to its former glory (Berkes, 22 1 and 305). 
This is not to say that the Turks completely lost their distinct sense of identity 
during the Ottoman Era. The Turks were intent on remaining a unified group. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that they retained folk customs and the Turkish language, 
although in modified form. These enduring elements of Turkish culture represented a 
potential basis for creating a Turkish state (Karpat 2000: 22), but the Turks were 
conflicted about actively drawing distinctions between themselves and others within 
the empire. This is because they were " . .  . intent on retaining intact a multi-ethnic 
Empire. Many of them wished to strengthen their 'Turkishness' ,  but were afraid of 
alienating non-Turks" (McCarthy, 209). Other groups within the empire were not as 
conflicted as the Turks. The Christian groups within the empire, such as the 
Armenians, wanted complete independence, and even other Islamic groups within the 
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empire like the Arabs and Albanians did much more to emphasize their racial 
distinctiveness than did the Turks (Berkes, 3 19). 
The First World War marked a major change in international politics, and the 
Ottoman Empire was to feel its impact in a dramatic way. The Ottomans 
unsuccessfully attempted to make an alliance with Britain before the war and then 
tried to remain neutral, but finally became allied with the Central Powers for a variety 
of reasons (Tuchman 1962: 137-141). These reasons included a longstanding fear of 
Russia, who was now allied with the Ottoman' s  erstwhile allies, Great Britain and 
France. Also, the British reneged on selling the Ottomans two naval vessels, claiming 
that the Royal Navy needed the ships. The Germans then proceeded to make a gift to 
the Turks of two warships. The combined effect of these circumstances was an 
Ottoman alliance with the Germans and Austrians. 
Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic 
The outcome of the war was disastrous for the Ottoman Empire. Significant 
groups of Arabs had not even fought with Turks, but instead decided to cooperate 
with the British. At war' s end, the empire was in a state of collapse and it seemed 
that all of the territories and peoples of the empire would come under control of the 
victorious Allied Powers. However, General Mustafa Kemal rallied the Turks and 
under his leadership they established a Turkish Republic on the Anatolian peninsula 
in 1922. The Turks seemingly had been forced by events to make a life for 
themselves. 
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Kemal, later known as Ataturk, undertook many secularizing reforms that drastically lessened the power of Islam within Turkey. Some of these reforms were aimed at changing the customs of the people, such as banning the fez or prohibiting women from wearing traditional Islamic dress. Other reforms were of a more blatantly political nature, such as discontinuing the sultanate and caliphate. While these reforms seem to be a direct repudiation of Turkish sentiment in the pre-war era, it can be argued that the Turks were acting much as they had when they accepted Islam centuries before in that they were making efforts to become identified with a new and superior civilization. This was further symbolized by the Turkish attempt to rid their language and law code of Arabic and Persian influences and replacing them with European influences on language and law (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 188). Just as the Ottoman Empire had been economically, philosophically, and militarily superior during the tenth century, so was western civilization at the beginning of the twentieth century. Berkes claims that this was the overriding concern of the new republic, stating that, "The supreme problem was, therefore, to develop the country along the lines of Western civilization . . . .  To reach the stage achieved by the civilized nations ! That became the motif of the new ideology"( 1964: 463). Reflecting this desire, Ataturk claimed that the two fundamental needs of the Turkish people were independence and civilization (Hotham, 23) and asked, "Can one name a single nation that has not turned to the West in its quest for civilization?" (Mango, 1999: 396). Ataturk's success in imposing secular reforms was in part due to the strong leadership he exhibited in the war of independence, but it was also due to the fact that 76 
a significant portion of the population of the new republic wanted to be part of 
western civilization. This was demonstrated by writings of a leading Turkish social 
theorist of the period of the day, Ziya Golkap, who claimed that Turkish culture was 
influenced by European civilization as much as it was by Islamic civilization 
(Golkap, 167). Whether this was true or not, it was accepted by many Turks because 
it " . . .  allowed national pride to be reconciled with the adoption of European ways" 
(Zurcher 1993: 36). Even the name of the new republic, Turkey, was of European 
origin, and was adopted in spite of the fact that it had long had a negative connotation 
in both the Ottoman and European worlds (B . Lewis 1998: 60). 
What is striking about Turkey's  adoption of Western methods is that the rest 
of the ethnic and national groups that once composed the now defunct Ottoman 
Empire did exactly the opposite. According to Bernard Lewis: 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the experience of 
Turkey in Westernization was in general shared with the former Arab 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Since 1918  there has been a complete 
divergence. In Turkey the stream has been broadened and deepened; 
elsewhere it has been deflected or turned back (1955 : 3 1 3). 
The Turks, once the most enthusiastic and devout members of the Ottoman Empire, 
were now embracing European civilization with the same fervor as they has 
demonstrated when becoming affiliated with the Arabs and Persians under the mantle 
of Islam a thousand years before. 
The orthodox view of Turkish foreign policy during the Ataturk era is that it 
was decidedly neutralist. This is undoubtedly true up to a point, but it is not 
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completely so. This is because Ataturk and the many other Turkey's leaders, as described above, felt a strong need to identity with the West. In the early twenties, just what states comprised the "West" was in question. Even the Germans and Russians were drawing on Western ideas as a basis for their new governments. Therefore, Turkey was unsure of how to proceed other than to maintain a neutralist policy. This was the case until Turkey could gain membership in the League of Nations. From the beginning of the Republic then, it was clear that Turkey would cast its lot with the West and its ideas of democracy and collective security. Although Turkey had no history of democratic government, its desire to be a part of the West meant that it would have to eventually erect a governmental structure similar to that of Western countries. Turkey's democratic evolution was not a smooth one as Ataturk often governed by decree and the post Ataturk era was marked by periodic military coups, but the nature of its general progress toward democracy during the twentieth century is undisputed. If adopting democratic government proved to be a way within Turkey for Turks to demonstrate that they were part of the Western world, membership in the League would demonstrate Turkish allegiance to Western international ideals and provide the formal affiliation with the West the as the Turks desired. During Turkey's war for independence and survival the League had the goal of destroying Ataturk's rebellion and dividing Turkish territory among the Western powers. However, once the Turks won the war they quickly forgave and spent the majority of the 1920s attempting to become a member of the League. This was in 78 
spite of the fact that in 1926 the League decided in favor of Iraq in a border dispute between Turkey and the British dominion of Iraq (Hardie, 77-78). The fact that the Turks coveted League membership after these two instances of opposition seems to confirm that it wanted to gain identification with the West by becoming a member of the League. This was summed up by a member of the Turkish assembly, who stated concerning Turkey's admission to the League, "The idea of the League of Nations is one which is held in great esteem by the Turkish Revolution and the Turkish Republic. We might almost say that it is one of our own ideas." [Speech by Tevfik Rustu Aras, 15 July 1931, in the Grand National Assembly. (Turkey and the United Nations, 31)]. Within several years Turkey was given an opportunity to show its allegiance to the League. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 was a blow to the League's prestige (Turkey and the United Nations, 35), nevertheless, Turkey upheld the League policy of economic sanctions against Italy even though it hurt trade relations with the Italians (Danilov, 122). Having learned the price of involvement in world war during 1914-18, the Turks successfully stayed out of most of the Second World War. The Turks did come in on the Allied side once the Germans were on the defensive, in early 1945. The reason that compelled them to declare war on the Third Reich was membership in the soon to be organized United Nations (Turkey and the United Nations, 71). Once again, the Turks had acted only when they were promised membership in an international organization that was based in the West and organized on Western principles. 79 
After the war Britain was Turkey' s principal Western ally, but, in accordance 
with its shrinking power and resources, the British decided to relinquish this role. 
The United States, much to the pleasure of Turkey, took over this role by extending 
military aid to Turkey, along with Greece, during the years immediately after the war 
under the Truman Doctrine. However, the Truman Doctrine only increased Turkey' s 
desire to build broader relationships with the West, and the United States in 
particular. According to Kemal Karpat, ''The new role as partners of the West and 
especially the uninhibited friendship of the United States, the defender of Western 
civilization, was in some Turkish eyes the proof that they were finally accepted and 
became part of the Western world" ( 1975: 6). 
At the end of World War II the United States had realized that it could no 
longer depend on Great Britain to maintain global stability, and the rise of the 
Communist bloc only reinforced this notion. When the Soviets abandoned even the 
pretense of peaceful coexistence with the West and began working to inspire 
Communist revolutions abroad, the US adopted a general policy that would attempt to 
" . . .  organize the Free World into an anti-communist coalition that could overlook 
pressing local demands in order to ward off the international conspiracy" (Whetten, 
12). In the early postwar era one of the main tools the US employed to oppose this 
international conspiracy of communism was the UN. In 1949 only six of the sixty­
four members of the UN were communist countries, and the US believed that the rest 
of the members would vote with the US (Krasner, 63). This situation further 
contributed to the Turkish perception that the US was strongly linked to the UN and 
that support of one meant support of the other. 
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The initiation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 represented another opportunity for the Turks to become more closely identified with the West. It was clear that the Turks saw NATO membership as a symbol of membership in the Western community (Tachau, 174). After Turkey was denied full membership in its initial bid for entry there was considerable disappointment reflecting Turkish concerns about its standing in the West, leading one Turkish newspaperman to comment that Turkey " . . .  wanted to be a real and contributing part of the Western family, and not merely a well-behaved stepchild" (Kilic, 157) . The importance of the desire to be a full-fledged member of the West was so strong that one scholar has even claimed that " . . .  Soviet pressures provided a lever by means of which Turks could gain their ultimate goal : full acceptance by the West" (Tachau, 174). With the coming of the Korean War the Turks were again given an opportunity to prove their value to an international organization, the UN. The Turkish government's decision to join the American led UN effort to turn back communist aggression in Korea is widely understood as being motivated by the Turkish presumption that Turkish participation would enhance Turkey's bid for NATO membership (Ahmad, 391). Prime Minister Menderes immediately sent troops to participate in the UN forces, finding a way to circumvent the normally slow parliamentary procedures necessary to mobilize military forces (Ahmad, 391 ). The Turks were not only to suffer the normal casualties of war, but also repercussions at home. Bulgaria, being a member of the Communist Bloc, forced 250,000 Muslims out of Bulgaria and into Turkey as an act of revenge for Turkey's participation in the war (Zurcher, 248). Swamped with refugees, the Turkish government had to find a 81 
means to feed and house this mass of people who had just days before been Bulgarian 
citizens. 
The Turks had paid a heavy price for joining the UN effort to contain 
communist aggression in Korea, but their participation was not in vain because the 
Turks realized their long coveted objective when they became full members of NATO 
in 1952. NATO membership, however, did not sate the Turkish need for Western 
affiliation. The Turks felt that membership in more organizations would bind them 
that much closer to the West. In 1953 the US asked Turkey to join Greece and 
Yugoslavia in the Balkan Pact with the idea of strengthening American influence in 
the region. The Turks were glad to agree to this. A somewhat different outcome 
resulted when the Turks invited the US to join the Baghdad Pact [later known as the 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)] , a collective security treaty that included 
Turkey, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. (G. Harris, 1972: 64). The Turks were 
unsuccessful in this invitation, for while the US maintained bases in Turkey, it agreed 
only to sign an agreement of cooperation with Turkey and refused to enter the Pact. 
This incident reflected a trend in Turkish-American relations in which the Turks 
acquiesced to American requests but Americans did not respond in kind when the 
Turks came with similar requests. This trend developed because the, ''Turks had 
never really analyzed the nature and limits of this friendship critically" (Erden, 94). 
The Turkish inability to realistically understand the nature of its relationship with the 
US was symptomatic of Turkey's needs for affiliation with the West. 
This trend became more marked in 1957 when NATO decided to install 
medium range atomic Jupiter missiles in Western Europe. While many of the 
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Western European countries had been uneasy about nuclear weapons on their soil, the Turks " . . .  had been almost alone in their enthusiasm for stationing missiles on Turkish territory" (G. Harris 1972: 92). Also in 1957, the Turks directed attention to the danger of neighboring Syria falling under communism and massed troops on the Syrian border. It was unlikely that the Turkish troops would cross the border even if communist elements had succeeded in taking control of the Syrian government, and it seems more likely that the Turks' " . .  . intention was to was to dramatize the issue before the world and indicate, especially to the United States, that Turkey would fully support some kind of intervention . . . if the United States decided upon such a move" (Lenczowski, 145). Once again, the Turks were acting enthusiastically in support of the goals of the Western Alliance to the possible detriment of its own interests as each time the Turks supported Western interests in the Middle East it drew the ire of Turkey's Islamic neighbors. For the Turks, NATO membership meant not only support from the Western powers for Turkey, but also a readiness to make the foreign policy goals of the Western Powers Turkey's own (Erden, 44 ). This was reflected not only in matters regarding the immediate defense of Europe, as installation of the Jupiters demonstrated, but also in Turkey's policies toward developing countries around the world. Instead of acting in support of Third World countries that might aspire to the dignity that Turkey had achieved in winning its revolution in the early 1920s, Turkey sought to continually prove its affiliation with the Western powers and thereby undermine the hopes of Third World countries that found themselves in confrontation with the First World. Instead of supporting its Islamic neighbors in their struggles against the colonial powers, Turkey favored the 
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British cause in Egypt and the French in Algeria (Ahmad 1993: 119). When the Indians invaded the Portuguese colony of Goa in late 1961, a colony that was located on Indian soil, the Turks were quick to join the US and Great Britain in sponsoring a UN resolution demanding the withdrawal of Indian troops (Erden, 63). Similarly, even after the cooling in relations with the US caused by the Johnson letter, in the late sixties the Turks voted against the PRC's request to enter the UN and supported the disarmament goals of the Western powers (Erden, 130). These instances demonstrate the continuance of the pattern of strong Turkish affiliation with Western based international organizations. Simply put, after the Second World War, the Turks increasingly " . . .  predicated their entire foreign policy on faith in commitments from their allies. Various Turkish governments had gone to great lengths to cooperate with their alliance partners, even beyond formal treaty obligations" (Harris 1975: 60). A major reason that the Turks put such emphasis on these commitments was that they were culturally disposed affiliate with the countries of a successful an established civilization and the twentieth century manifestation of this disposition was Turkish penchant for seeking membership in Western based international organizations. The specific case to be analyzed in Chapter VI, the Turkish-American confrontation over Cyprus in 1964, represents another instance in this pattern. The Turkish government under Prime Minister Ismet Inonu announced that they would invade Cyprus for the purpose of aiding Turkish Cypriots who were involved in a civil conflict with Greek Cypriots. U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, fearing that the Greeks would react to this Turkish invasion by also becoming involved militarily, 84 
thus leading to a war between two members of NATO, communicated that if the 
Turks did invade the U.S. and other NATO countries would not be responsible if the 
Soviets took advantage of the situation and moved against Turkey. Upon receiving 
this communication, Inonu immediately abandoned the plans for invasion. While 
there are competing reasons as to why the Turks made the decision that they did, a 
compelling case can be made that this cultural pattern of affiliation with Western 
international organizations was a factor that caused the Turks to call of the invasion 
of Cyprus. The events surrounding this episode, the possible influences on decision­
making, and statements by Prime Minister Inonu will be analyzed in Chapter IV for 
the purpose of shedding light on the decision and why it was affected by cultural 
factors. 
Conclusion 
The Turkish experience in the world demonstrates the importance of earlier 
conditioning. As defined in the Chapter II, culture is a product of group response to 
the physical or social environment. During the middle of the first millennium A.D. 
the Turks began to move westward across central Asia. Instead of occurring in a 
single place over time, Turkish history took place in different locations. Unlike most 
national societies, the Turks were not permanent members of a regional civilization. 
No one questions whether the French are European or the Koreans are Asian , but the 
Turks do not easily fit into a civilizational category. This circumstance forced the 
Turks do seek security and membership within different civilizations at different 
times. Earlier migration conditioned the Turks to look for physical and social 
85 
security within strong civilizations. This need for affiliation with strong and superior 
civilizations became an important Turkish cultural trait. 
This is evidenced in Turkish behavior during the Ottoman period and during 
the twentieth century. After wandering across Central Asia and experimenting with 
other ethnic and national groups, the Turks enthusiastically joined the Islamic 
movement that became the Ottoman Empire, submerging their national identity more 
than any other group within the empire. While the Turks were militarily strong, they 
always looked to the Arabs and Persians as the societies that originated the religion 
and culture of Islam. Following the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, rather than 
supporting the independence of the Arabs and Persians from the Western colonial 
powers, the Turks enthusiastically supported the foreign policies of European powers. 
During the Cold War, the Turks were uninhibited in their solicitation of American 
friendship and attempted to become members of any international organization that 
was supported by the US and Wes tern Europe. While the Turks attached themselves 
to different civilizations at different times, the role that they played within those 
civilizations was similar, always trying to do a little more to show their allegiance. 
Thus, the cultural trait of seeking membership in and approval from states within an 
advanced civilization grew out of centuries old experience and continued to affect the 
way that Turkey operated in the world during the twentieth century. 
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CHAPTER V 
CHINA AND THE WORLD 
BEFORE AND AFTER WESTERN 
INTERVENTION The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate how Chinese foreign policy decision-making during the period from the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) until the end of the Cold War was influenced by the combined effects of Chinese culture and the international social environment during this time. This chapter, therefore, serves a similar function to the preceding chapter on Turkey, in that it provides the context for the analysis of the Chinese decision to go to war with Vietnam in 1979 in Chapter VI. The specific aspect of Chinese culture to be examined is China's traditional feeling of cultural superiority toward other states. In the following sections how this feeling of cultural superiority developed among Chinese, how it has evolved, and how it has affected foreign policy during the twentieth century will be discussed. Also, as in Chapter IV, other aspects of Chinese culture (There are many which have received a great amount of attention.) that are not pertinent to this study will not be discussed. The geographic, historical, and cultural circumstances of China stand in marked contrast to those of Turkey. An important initial observation is that East Asia 87 
developed in relative isolation from the rest of the world, leading to distinctive cultural patterns which have been retained for thousands of years (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960; Bianco 1971). Concerning China specifically, those persons speaking the Chinese language have inhabited North China, the original home of East Asian civilization, from the time of the earliest historical record, and have expanded into other regions such as Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960: 8). There is no record of an ancient hero who led the Chinese to East Asia, and it is assumed by the Chinese that they have always inhabited East Asia (Butterfield, 24-25). The Chinese language has also been instrumental in maintaining Chinese culture in that it is fundamentally different from Western languages, leading one experienced observer of Chinese culture to comment that, ''The introduction of new concepts into Chinese is like putting new wine into old bottles; the wine is often somewhat changed, if not spoiled" (Clubb 1978: 302). These circumstances have caused Chinese to believe in the essential distinctiveness and superiority of their culture. China and the World Before 1949 This sense of superiority was reinforced by the fact that China was larger, richer, and intellectually more advanced than its neighbors (Harris, 120). This enabled China to maintain influence over these smaller countries on her borders. Some, like Korea, could be taken militarily. Others, such as Japan and Vietnam, which could not be subdued by force, nevertheless stood in awe of China and demonstrated this by their enduring efforts to absorb and implement Chinese ways. If 88 
other countries acknowledged China's greatness, why should the Chinese themselves question it? This had been the case since before the time of Christ. Beginning during the . . .  second and first millennia B.C, for the non-Chinese tribes of what is now central and southern China and for the nomads of the northern steppes, Chinese culture was the sole representative of a way of life based on intensive agriculture, towns, and ordered large-scale government. As such it impressed the uncivilized neighbors of the Chinese, even when they raided and plundered it, and the discovery by the Chinese that their cultural prestige could be used diplomatically to tame barbarians who could not be crushed by military power was certainly one of the sources of the idea, so prominent in traditional Chinese philosophy, that the successful ruler was one who attracted people to his 'virtue' instead of subduing them by force (Hudson, 340-34 1). Related to this conception was the Chinese idea that u_se of force was a threat to political order and that civilians were better disposed to be effective rulers (Kracke, Jr. ,  333). The correctness of this system was confirmed both formally and informally by the smaller states in East Asia. The rulers of these countries came to the Chinese court to receive the seal of office from the Chinese emperor, and this added to their prestige and justified their rule within their respective countries (Michael and Taylor, 53). All of the countries that came to the Chinese court had to pay tribute to China, therefore, acknowledging Chinese superiority. This tribute system became the method by which Chinese emperors dealt with foreign governments (Fairbank 1969: 25). Concerning manners and etiquette, throughout East Asia the use of chopsticks, 89 
first used in China, conferred upon the individual who possessed this ability the air of civilization (Hudson, 342). Occasionally, of course, those states bordering the Middle Kingdom did undertake successful military invasions of China, but this did not cause the Chinese to doubt their place in the world. This is because even those that conquered China inevitably were overcome by Chinese culture. In the fourth century, the Toba Tatars successfully invaded northern China, but by the end of the fifth century " . . . their emperors had prohibited the use of their own language and ordered all their people to adopt the Chinese tongue, Chinese customs, and Chinese dress" (Bloodworth, 345). The Mongols and the Manchus undertook the most serious foreign invasions, in the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries respectively. The Mongols began their reign over China in 1279, and they quickly incorporated many Chinese traditions into their governmental procedures, including court ceremonies, Confucian rites, employing Confucian advisors, and even setting up an office to write the history of previous dynasties (a task that each new Chinese dynasty had carried out) (Roberts, 108). Native Chinese were initially uncomfortable with the Mongol conquest, and because they outnumbered the Mongols, were able to make many demands on the Mongol administration. During their ninety years of power in China, the Mongols became increasingly sinicized, and this trend began to accelerate during the second half of the dynasty (Roberts, 1 16). Although the Mongol rulers, later known as the Yuan Dynasty, made great efforts to accommodate the population, they were eventually overcome by a native group of Han Chinese, the Ming Dynasty, in 1368. Despite the fact that they had driven the Mongols out of China, the Ming emperors 90 
continued to fear that the Mongols would again invade. This caused the Ming to 
withdraw from the world and concentrate on northern border defense (Fairbank 1992: 
139). Even so, " . . . as time went on, the Ming shed their anti-Mongol animosities and 
saw themselves as the heirs of the Yuan within China and beyond" (Adshead, 176). 
While the Mongols never regained sufficient strength to launch another 
invasion of China, another group from the north moved southward and invaded Ming 
China. The Manchus swept down from the northeast in 1644 and overcame all of 
China shortly thereafter. Although the Manchus maintained some of the their 
customs such as forcing men to wear the queue, they began adapting some of their 
customs even before they initiated the invasion of China. During the 1630s, they 
reorganized their civil administration along Chinese lines (Fairbank, 1992: 147). 
Once in power, Manchu emperors subscribed to the traditional Chinese tributary 
system, involving the granting of commercial rights to other states in exchange for 
their acknowledgement of Chinese cultural superiority (Roberts, 156). These 
instances caused the conquered Chinese to believe that whether they resisted military 
intervention or not, others would still realize the superiority of the Chinese. One 
scholar characterized the situation as one in which " . . . the whole Chinese attitude has, 
in the past, been one of 'if we bring them into our country, if we treat them in the 
right way, they will recognize, they will acknowledge the virtues of our civilization 
and they will become sinicized as a result of it"' (Harris, 12 1-22). 
The Chinese took this attitude towards both their neighbors in East Asia and 
states in other parts of the world and, just as neighboring states were dazzled by the 
Chinese, initially so were the first Europeans who visited or read about China. Marco 
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Polo' s travels in China during the thirteenth century were well publicized throughout 
Europe, and he wrote of cities much larger than any in Europe and concluded that the 
manners and ethical behavior of the Chinese were of a higher level than those found 
in Europe (Hart, 130). In the next four centuries more Europeans visited China, 
primarily missionaries. Occasionally the Chinese engaged these foreigners for 
specific purposes such as when ( 1644) the Jesuit priest Adam Schall was given a 
minor government appointment in China, but these appointments were few because 
before this China " . . .  secure in her superiority, had never dreamed that anything of 
value might be found in the West" (Spence, 4 ). 
By the early sixteenth century Portuguese trade ships came to Southeastern 
China, with the Spanish, Dutch, and English following over the next two hundred 
years. The Chinese compelled these "outer barbarians" to formally submit to the 
Chinese emperor as the ruler of mankind and promised them that if they behaved 
correctly they would be treated in a generous manner (Clyde and Beers, 64). 
Regarding treatment of the traders in the ports that they visited, they were treated 
cordially but, "Judging by Chinese regulations and proclamations, Europeans were 
considered to be of a lower order of moral being than the natives and were so treated" 
(Vinacke, 33). 
During the 1600s and 1700s, Europeans began to import porcelain and other 
artistic products from China on a larger scale, and this " . . .  deeply affected the 
aesthetic sensibility of Europe in that age" (Hudson, 350). At about this time 
Europeans also became interested in Chinese ideas of government (Kracke, Jr., 335). 
Europeans who were looking for a model of a benevolent monarchy believed that 
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China was nearer to this ideal than any of the European governments, and French 
economists used China as an example to justify their theories (Franz and Taylor, 9). 
These attitudes only served to confirm China's sense of cultural superiority. 
The French Revolution marked a major change in European thought and 
strongly influenced both economics and politics for the next century. Europeans no 
longer regarded unconstitutional monarchical rule as an ideal type of government, and 
they believed states that were governed solely by kings or emperors to be backward. 
The leading European powers, now much more powerful than countries on all other 
continents, began to arrive in Asia in force demanding trade concessions. As 
described above, Europeans had formerly been cordial toward China, and the first 
Western diplomatic missions to China resulted in accordance with Chinese wishes, 
but this was to change with the coming of the nineteenth century and the arrival of 
British power in East Asia. 
The Chinese court's common procedure for receiving foreign diplomatic 
missions was to compel foreign representatives to kotow before the Chinese emperor 
in acknowledgement of Chinese superiority, and the Chinese assumed that all 
countries from the far west would perceive Chinese greatness just as other Asian 
countries had. When Lord Macartney arrived in Beijing in 1793 with the goal of 
establishing trade relations between the British and Chinese empires, he was brought 
to the palace and asked to kotow. He subsequently refused, although the Chinese 
decided to record that Macartney had indeed kotowed before the Son of Heaven 
(Teng and Fairbank, 20). This marked the beginning, from the Chinese point of view, 
of Western intransigence. From a historical perspective, it can be understood as the 
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beginning of China' s painful process of modernization. In the words of John King 
Fairbank, it marked the tragedy of the Chinese state, in that " . . .  her adjustment to the 
barbarians of Inner Asia was such poor preparation for contact with the modern 
West" (Fairbank 1969: 25). 
During the following decades, the Chinese continued to believe that after 
sufficient exposure to the Chinese world, the British would come to understand 
Chinese greatness. The British, on the other hand, decided that if China could not be 
persuaded to open its markets, it would have to be coerced. The result of this 
divergence of views was the Opium War of 1 840-4 1 .  Largely because of their 
immense technological advantage, the British won an easy victory and forced the 
Chinese to grant concessions in cities such as Hong Kong and Shanghai among 
others. Once the British victory became known, other powers decided that they must 
act quickly to get their share. The French also successfully forced the Chinese to 
grant concessions in Amoy and Shanghai . 
One scholar, commenting on China' s traditional feeling of superiority and the 
difference in Chinese and Japanese responses to Western intervention, states that 
" . . .  China reacted differently because of her almost complete defenselessness; here 
there was no aggressive tradition, probably just on account of this feeling of 
superiority" (Romein, 56). By centuries end, Japan had learned not only to deflect 
Western intentions but to act the same way as Western countries. Japan intervened 
in China and proceeded to defeat China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1 894-95, leading 
to the Japanese acquisition of Taiwan. Clearly, the ancient philosophy of the Chinese 
had to be modified, but how? 
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Despite the many setbacks China suffered at the hands of Western powers beginning in the early nineteenth century, the idea of China's greatness was never totally eradicated. This argument has been advanced by many who have studied China during the twentieth century. According to Teng and Fairbank, the Chinese leadership during the period between the Opium War and the inception of the Chinese Communist Party maintained an ethnocentric outlook (3). It was difficult to pursue policies that reflected this ethnocentrism, however, for several reasons. First, as related above, the shock of being subjected to invasion and intimidation from powers that did not acknowledge Chinese superiority led to much confusion about how to solve the problem. Also, the Chinese simply did not have the military power to eject the Western powers that had humiliated China. Finally, during the era of Nationalist (Guomindang) power (1911-1949) the government could not fully exploit the nation's resources because it controlled only a portion of the country. The remaining part was under the control of various warlords, the communists, or the Japanese. Foreign Policy of the PRC To understand the international outlook of the People's Republic of China (PRC) one must first understand the conditions under which the Chinese Communist Party came into being and took power. Although China was not a combatant in the First World War, it had sent workers to France to assist the Allies in tasks that did not involve actual fighting. Following the war, China had pressed the delegates of the Versailles Peace Conference to restore territory in Shandong Province to Chinese sovereignty. This territory had been under German control before 1914 but was taken 95 
by the Japanese early in the war. China petitioned the delegates at Versailles to declare that the Japanese must abandon all claims in Shandong. Instead of granting the Chinese requests the Versailles delegates awarded the Shandong territory to the Japanese for their active participation against Germany during the war. This rebuff caused outrage in China, beginning with student demonstrations on May 4, 1919. Commercial strikes, boycott movements, and worker demonstrations followed the initial student demonstrations. China had placed its hopes in President Wilson's plan for international justice and been bitterly disappointed. Rather than seizing on the current of anti-Japanese and anti-foreign feeling, the Guomindang government hesitated because they wanted to maintain good relations with Japan in order to obtain international loans (Cheseneaux, Le Barbier, and Bergere, 100). It was in this atmosphere that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its first meeting in the summer of 1920. While the Chinese Communists were unquestionably interested in bringing about radical change in Chinese domestic politics, domestic politics could not be divorced from China's international situation. This became increasingly apparent when the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931. The Guomindang government's response to Japanese was half hearted at best. The Guomindang was more concerned with the destruction of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and only when this was accomplished would they tum all of their efforts against the Japanese. The Communists, on the other hand, constant} y advocated that a war of resistance against Japan must be the foremost national priority and that this war was inevitable (Snow, 447). 96 
When the Japanese widened the war and moved into China proper in the 
summer of 1937 the Guomindang and the Communists negotiated a temporary 
settlement and joined forces in a common effort to eject the Japanese. However, once 
again the Guomindang effort was something less than it could have been. When the 
Japanese took Shanghai in 1938, Chiang Kai-shek sacrificed his his best armies there 
even though he thought victory was impossible. He did thi s because he thought that 
the international press coverage of the battle would provoke other countries to 
intervene on China' s behalf (Tuchman 197 1 :  169). During the years that followed 
Chiang exhibited more concern for maintaining his own power than defeating the 
Japanese, constantly refusing to accept American proposals that would strengthen 
Guomindang armies but would also strengthen potential challengers to Chiang's  own 
rule (Tsou, 1 1 1 - 1 12). 
The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, made a concerted effort to fight 
the Japanese. While not winning any major battles against the Japanese, the 
Communists were successful in using guerilla tactics to harass Japanese forces and 
defeat them in minor engagements. This caused many Chinese to believe that the 
CCP's People' s Liberation Army (PLA) was a major force in defeating the Japanese 
invaders (Uhalley, 62). Whether this was based in fact is irrelevant. What is 
important is that the Communists established a reputation among the Chinese masses 
for aggressively opposing foreign powers trying to intervene in China. That the CCP 
would strongly oppose foreign intervention strengthened the legitimacy of the CCP's 
claim that it deserved to be the sole power in China. This, among other reasons, 
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persuaded many Chinese to support the Communist effort against the Guomindang 
when the Chinese Civil War resumed following the end of World War II. 
After the Communists won victory in 1949, the Chinese mainland was once 
again united under one government. The new leadership was free to make statements 
and policies without intervention from foreign powers. These statements and policies 
exhibited, albeit in an altered form, the ancient idea of China' s distinctiveness and 
superiority. Mao wasted no time in expressing his thoughts on China' s position in the 
world. When he mounted the Tiananmen Gate to proclaim the founding of the 
People ' s  Republic on October 1 ,  1949, he stated, "Our nation will never again be an 
insulted nation . . .  our revolution has gained the sympathy and acclamation of the 
broad masses throughout the world . . .  we wi ll emerge in the world as a nation with a 
high culture" (Schram, 1 10). Mao' s words indicated that China still believed in its 
own greatness, but instead of seeking to demonstrate its higher culture to others by 
letting them come to China and realize Chinese superiority, the Chinese intended to 
demonstrate it through force of arms. 
In one sense, the basic goal of Chinese foreign policy during the period 
between the establishment of the PRC and the end of the Cold War was not dissimi lar 
from that of other states. This basic goal was the protection of territorial integrity. 
However, the Chinese conception of how to achieve this goal was intertwined with 
the Chinese historic conception of China' s place in the world. Historically, strong 
Chinese dynasties had attempted to culturally dominate bordering states in their 
efforts to insure the security of the Chinese state that might be threatened by 
culturally inferior foreigners. Now, however, this traditional outlook was 
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strengthened as it became fused with the idea of forceful Marxist opposition to 
international imperialism and a new sense of Western style nationalism (Latourette, 
388). The product of these influences was a Chinese foreign policy that integrated 
territorial defense with a desire to become the most revolutionary of the world's 
communist states (Fairbank, Reishauer, and Craig, 879). This was reinforced by the 
fact that the senior members of the Communist government had more military and 
combat experience than the upper level leaderships of all other governments in the 
world (Powell, 347). 
This meant that China's concept of the maintenance of territorial integrity 
differed substantially from that of other states. If during the past century the Chinese 
had permitted the Russians, French, British, and Japanese to enter their territory with 
the hope that these foreigners would realize the superiority of Chinese culture once 
they were exposed to it, now the Chinese would be especially vigilant concerning all 
possibilities of foreign incursion and related border questions (Camilleri, 22). 
Ironically, Mao's most well known idea pertaining to national defense, the 
concept of the "People's War," was defensive in nature and inappropriate for the type 
of border disputes that China became repeatedly involved in during the Cold War. 
Particularly suitable for a large country with a massive population, the strategy of 
People's War was to be implemented by allowing an invading army to progress deep 
into Chinese territory and thus, overextend itself. Then the Chinese civilian militia 
under the leadership of the People's Liberation Army would overwhelm the invaders 
from all directions. While this line of thinking was a natural progression in thought 
from Mao's ideas on guerilla warfare and a useful strategy for total war, it was 
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useless in situations where foreign countries made limited attacks or used the threat of 
military force to extract concessions. 
Therefore, a strategy was needed that could match lower level threats and 
demonstrate China' s commitment to violent revolution. Although Mao did not write 
about specific procedures to counter limited threats, a clear pattern emerged in the 
Chinese responses to these threats during the Cold War (Gurtov and Hwang, 256-
258). This pattern involved Chinese recognition of a perceived threat, and then the 
undertaking of a pre-emptive attack that would be followed by either a pause for 
negotiations or a prompt Chinese withdrawal . The desired effect was to show 
probable aggressors that China had gained the initiative, or as in the case of the Sino­
Indian and Sino-Vietnamese border conflicts, to "teach the enemy a lesson ." The 
dynamic and offensive nature of these pre-emptive strikes was not unrelated to the 
ideological stance that the PRC had adopted. Marxist ideology meshed well with the 
Chinese need to express their historic greatness and assuage their bruised pride that 
stemmed from Chinese humiliation by the colonial powers during the previous 
decades. The revolutionary nature of communist ideology places a strong emphasis 
on the positive consequences of war (Camilleri, 24), and this was readily translated 
into action in many instances by the PRC when opportunities presented themselves. 
On other occasions the Chinese did not act militarily but employed combative 
rhetoric suggesting that China would welcome conflict if the opposition wanted to do 
battle. 
With the onset of the Korean War in 1950, the Chinese were quickly given an 
opportunity to prove their mettle. When U.S. troops drove up the Korean peninsula 
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toward the Chinese border, Mao ordered hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops 
into action. The decision to intervene in Korea was a considerable gamble. 
According to Allen Whiting ( 1960), the risks that China incurred included the 
possibility of the US Air Force bombing north China, the possibility of American 
assisted Nationalist Chinese landing on the mainland to reignite the civil war, delayed 
admission to the United Nations, indefinite postponement of the PRC' s invasion of 
Taiwan, and the further draining of Chinese resources that had been nearly exhausted 
in the previous two decades of civil and anti-Japanese warfare. Nevertheless, the 
Chinese did intervene, possibly " . . .  because a military clash between Communist 
China and the United States was inevitable because of the ideological component in 
Peking's  foreign policy and the quest for greatness which had always been deeply 
imbedded in Chinese history and culture and which was reactivated by a revived 
sense of power and unity after a century of humiliation and defeat" (Tsou, 588). 
Rather than being an isolated incident, the Korean War marked a trend of 
conflict in Asia between the Chinese and Americans. China confronted the United 
States over Taiwan and the offshore islands that the Nationalists still possessed, 
Quemoy and Matsu, several other times ( 1954 and 1958) during the decade. While 
these actions might have appeared risky to some, the Chinese felt that the risks 
involved were acceptable because they were able to demonstrate that they could not 
be bullied by a superpower (Zhang, 282). 
During the 1960s this trend continued. When the United States began to 
dramatically escalate American involvement in Vietnam in the late summer of 1965, 
the Johnson Administration warned China not to interfere and that if China did so the 
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United States would not hesitate to launch attacks against targets on Chinese soil (as 
the U.S. had not done in the Korean War). China refused to be intimidated by the 
threat and escalated the rhetorical battle by reminding the US that it now too 
possessed atomic weapons (Zagoria 1967: 77-78). 
While positioning itself as the chief foe of the United States and the Western 
imperialism that it represented was a substantial element of Chinese foreign policy, 
the Chinese also had no shortage of conflicts with enemies closer to home. In 1962 
the Chinese became involved in a month long border war with India over a disputed 
area on the Aksai Chin plateau. Indian forces had advanced into· the largely 
uninhabited area after the Chinese, claiming that this area was a part of Tibet, had 
constructed a road in the region. In October the People's Liberation Army launched 
an attack with vastly superior forces and drove the Indians back to the line that China 
claimed was the true border. The Chinese then pulled their forces out of the disputed 
area. This incident demonstrated that the Chinese behaved somewhat consistently in 
regard to border questions. No matter whether they faced superior or inferior forces, 
the Chinese acted to control the conflict by being the first to initiate and also break off 
hostilities. 
From the time of Krushchev's  1956 speech denunciating Stalin the ideological 
bonds that held China and the USSR together began to weaken. Mao saw 
Krushchev's change of emphasis as an attempt at revisionism within the Marxist 
camp. Mao's plans for rapid economic growth, as exemplified by the Great Leap 
Forward, deviated strongly from the Soviet model. During the early 1960s all Soviet 
technicians in China were recalled and the rift grew wider. One scholar, seeing the 102 
commonality in China's increasingly independent and aggressive path and the 
behavior of China's imperial past, wrote that during this period, " . . .  by striking out on 
her own, by supporting policies with her economic, military, and ideological 
resources, China sought to regain a diplomatic initiative that had been lost more than 
a century before" (Clyde and Beers, 444). As the ideological bickering between 
Moscow and Beijing increased, two traditional issues of power politics, allies and 
borders, also became areas of contention for the two foremost communist states. 
The Sino-Indian border confrontation further aggravated relations between the 
two communist giants. The Soviets developed increasingly friendly relations with 
India during the period and began supplying India with military aircraft in 1962. 
When the Chinese launched their reprisal in Aksai Chin, the Soviets refused to 
support either side and called for a cease-fire. As the Soviets were trying to establish 
stronger relations with India at the time, surely they found the attack undesirable, yet 
they made no direct response toward the Chinese. In 1965, China once again 
threatened India over the border issue, and this time the Soviets openly responded in a 
negative way toward China (Day, 65). 
Of a much more serious concern to the Soviets were the several border 
disputes that the USSR itself had with the PRC. During the middle and late 1960s 
there was a continual war of words emanating from both parties concerning 
boundaries in Xinjiang and Manchuria. Both states began to concentrate troops along 
the disputed border areas. Although some small scale fighting took place in 1963, 
neither country publicized these incidents. That tensions continued to stay at a high 
level through the rest of the decade was demonstrated by the Chinese effort to 
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construct an underground city below Beijing that would serve as a shelter for party leaders in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack. On March 2, 1969 the simmering conflict finally erupted in a border clash on Damansky (Chen Pao) Island in the Ussuri River, the Mancurian boundary line. Apparently, a numerically superior Chinese forced initiated an attack on a Soviet border patrol and the Soviets suffered heavy casualties (Clubb 1971: 500). On March 15 a larger confrontation took place in the same area. Each side charged the other with initiating hostilities but, once again, it seems likely that the Chinese attacked first, launching mortar and artillery attacks on what they believed to be a numerically inferior Russian force (Clubb 1971: 501). Instead of being taken by surprise, the Soviets were ready this time and opened a fierce counterattack employing artillery and aircraft. Some 800 Chinese were killed while the Soviets only lost sixty dead. After this encounter both armies side returned to their respective sides of the river and their governments began attempts to settle the border dispute diplomatically. The border clashes on the Manchurian border reflected the extent to which the Sino-Soviet relationship had deteriorated. Just as the Chinese believed themselves to be in great power competition with the imperialist United States, they also became involved in great power competition with the Soviet Union, their erstwhile communist ally. Gradually, the notion within China that the USSR was the senior communist state and China was an important and populous but still junior partner had crumbled. This was due to the fact that: 104 
China's history, culture, world view, its size and population, all served to inculcate the expectation that China could be no less than a partner. She might willingly· concede a pioneering status to the Soviet Union. And she might therefore wish, seek, and even expect, as birthright, to be able to draw on the economic and military power of the Soviet Union. But there could be no question of anything less than equal potential (Jacobsen, 53). The Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 represents another instance in this pattern. When Vietnam attempted to bring all of Indochina under its control in the late 1970s, China objected and threatened war. Vietnam's primary ally, the Soviet Union, threatened to attack China in the event of a Chinese attack on Vietnam. China would not be cowed and launched an invasion of Vietnam anyway. While the Soviets did not carry out their threats and the Chinese retreated after a month of hostilities, this does not change the fact that China undertook serious risks to demonstrate that it could not be bullied by anyone, even a superpower. The next chapter will provide a more in depth discussion of the risks involved in this decision. Conclusion Just as Turkey was forced to trade one set of allies for another during the early twentieth century, China was forced to change the way it pursued its foreign policy objectives. However, in both cases the transition was based on a larger continuity. The Turks continued to define their foreign policy goals by placing the interests of the their allies above their own, while the Chinese continued to attempt to show the world that they were one of the great powers. The violent nature of international politics in the twentieth century meant that China must abandon its pacific methods of asserting 105 
great power status and adopt violent and aggressive measures to demonstrate that China was indeed a great power. This has been recognized by many scholars of Chinese politics and history. One scholar who spent time in China during this period provides the following description the communist leadership's attitude toward foreign policy: In all their actions the Chinese leaders are goaded by a relentless drive for power status for China. China must be the equal of the United States and the Soviet Union and Great Britain. It must possess the authority that belongs to a Great Power. If there are some who do not believe so, they shall be made to believe it. If some Great Power is not ready to treat China as an equally Great Power, then it must be taught a lesson and made to do so. No sacrifice is too great, no effort too costly to achieve this status" (Dutt, 29). Other scholars who studied China during this period have come to similar conclusions. In his 1968 study of Chinese politics, Lucian Pye comments that, ''The most pervasive underlying Chinese emotion is a profound, unquestioned, generally unshakable identification with historical greatness" (50). Similarly, Robert Elegant finds that although Mao attempted to strip away many ancient cultural Chinese conventions, he was successful in gaining and maintaining power in China because, "Mao was the creature of an overwhelming compulsion to return China to her rightful place among the nations --- at their head." (1968: 20) This remains true in the post­Mao era, with faith in China's greatness being among the most important beliefs of Chinese foreign policy (Oksenberg 1999: 301). 106 
CHAPTER VI 
COMPARING DECISIONS UNDER 
CONDITIONS OF IMMEDIATE 
EXTENDED DETERRENCE Two instances of decision-making in situations of immediate extended deterrence will be compared in this chapter. There are two principal reasons that these cases have been chosen. First, while many of the cases included in lists of immediate extended deterrence encounters( Huth and Russett 1984; 1988) are questionable, these two cases have been defined as being legitimate cases even by those who doubt the concept of immediate extended deterrence (Lebow and Stein 1988). The definition of immediate extended deterrence, as iterated in Chapter I, is a situation in which state A seeks to deter state B from attacking state C. The second reason that these cases have been chosen is that it is not unanimously clear as to why the countries that were the object of deterrence, Turkey and China, made the decisions that they did. The preceding chapters have outlined the importance of national culture, how national culture adapts to changing international social conditions, and two examples of how this process works, Turkey and China. This chapter will provide a focused comparison of how their different evolutionary cultural processes affected Turkish 
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and Chinese foreign policy decision-making under circumstances of immediate extended deterrence. This does not imply that Turkey and China are equal or unequal, only that their leaders had to make decisions under similar circumstances. These circumstances included not only being the object of deterrence in an immediate extended deterrence encounter, but also being the object of deterrence in situations in which the country seeking to deter was a superpower. The Cyprus Crisis of 1964 The island of Cyprus is located very near the southern coast of Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea, and its population is composed of Greek and Turkish ethnic groups. During most of the nineteenth century Cyprus was ruled by the Ottoman Turks, and then ceded to the British Empire. Greeks and Turks on Cyprus had traditionally been at odds with one another, but British control may have served to unite Greeks, who have historically believed that Cyprus was part of a "greater Hellenic community," with the Turks in joint opposition to their overseers (Adams and Cottrel, 7-8). This period of harmony between the two populations was to last through much of the first half of the twentieth century, but the end of the Second World War and the dissolution of the British Empire brought profound change to Cyprus. In 1950 the British organized elections and many Greek Cypriots began to champion the idea of enosis, a conception of cultural unity among all Greeks, which became the central concept of the Greek nationalist movement on Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots' initial reaction was to remain allied to the Greek Cypriots in the 108 
effort to finally eject the British, but by the late 1950s the Turkish began to make common cause with the British because of fears of a Greek dominated Cyprus. In 1959, under the Zurich-London Agreements, Cyprus was given limited independence with stipulations that minority rights would be upheld by the guarantor powers of Turkey, Greece, and Great Britain. The Cypriot constitution outlined that the first president would be a Greek, that the vice-president would be a Turk, and that the House of Representatives would be freely elected. It was hoped that this arrangement would encourage Greeks and Turks on Cyprus to cooperate, but instead it only brought about stalemate. In the fall of 1963, led by President Makarios, Greek Cypriots began to campaign for changes in the constitution, claiming that under present circumstances the majority could not rule effectively. These requested changes amounted to a denial of rights to Cypriot Turks, and limited violence broke out between the two ethnic groups. Throughout the closing months of 1963 both groups made efforts to arm themselves, and in December open fighting broke out leading to a confrontation during Christmas week that left 300 dead. On Christmas Eve of 1963 the guarantor powers made the decision to intervene by asking Makarios to agree to a cease-fire. However, Makarios refused this offer and fighting continued. The British then deployed troops in the capitol city of Nicosia and established a neutral zone there, thereby slowing down the fighting to a degree. At this point both ethnic groups began to support abandonment of the constitution, with the Turks advocating partition of the island. British resources and will began to run out, and they then asked the United States to step in and send 109 
supplies and also support the establishment of an international peacekeeping mission 
composed of NATO country forces. 
The United States had no desire to become involved (Ball, 350), yet it saw no 
alternative and immediately began efforts to organize a NATO force. Makarios, who 
was pursuing a nonalignment policy and was under Soviet pressure not to allow a 
NATO mission in Cyprus (Cranshaw, 3), once again decided to rebuff the interested 
Western party, this time the United States. This meant that the US would have to go 
to the United Nations to gain support for a peacekeeping force, therefore giving the 
Soviets some say in the matter. In March of 1964 this force (UNFICYP) began 
operating in Cyprus, but it could not bring a complete stop to the fighting. 
On March 13 the Turkish government stated that it would unilaterally 
intervene by sending troops to Cyprus if the fighting did not cease. This was 
followed by Makarios' decision to allow Greek Prime Minister Papandreau to send 
Greek troops to the island for "protection" against a Turkish invasion. Throughout 
April and May the fighting continued as Turkish Cypriots made protest to the UN, 
and as Secretary General U Thant condemned the Greek Cypriots for escalating the 
confrontation. 
Although the Turks lacked landing craft and were inexperienced in 
amphibious operations (Harris 1985: 1 88), by late spring it seemed certain that the 
Turks would carry out the operation nevertheless (James, 106). Reports claimed that 
this invasion was scheduled for June 6 (Kosut, 121 ). There is little question that 
militarily, Turkey " . . .  had ample power to achieve a settlement in Cyprus according to 
her own wishes" (Bilge, 16 1) . Fearing imminent Turkish action that would lead to 
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the first war ever between NATO members, a war which could potentially provoke 
Soviet intervention, in June American President Lyndon Johnson sent Turkish 
President Inonu a letter stating that " . . .  your NATO allies have not had a chance to 
consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union 
if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention, without the full consent 
and understanding of its NATO allies" (Ball, 35 1). Johnson also reminded Inonu that 
the US and Turkey had agreed in 1947 that Turkey would not use any weapons 
furnished by the United States for reasons other than those stipulated at the time the 
weapons were provided (Ahmad 1977: 406). In reaction to what was to become 
known as the Johnson letter, the Turks immediately cancelled plans for an invasion of 
Cyprus. 
This decision to cancel the Cyprus invasion by Turkish Prime Minister Inonu 
conforms to the pattern of Turkish behavior discussed in Chapter IV, and represents 
the most dramatic instance of the Turkish desire to be affiliated with the Western 
powers and as a result, agreeing to their suggestions. Most accounts of the Turkish 
decision discuss the Johnson letter and the immediate response by the Turks but do 
not specifically declare why the Turks reacted as they did. This study seeks to put 
forward an answer to this question, the answer being that the Turkish need for 
affiliation with the West precluded a direct refusal of the American request. To 
completely understand this answer, the nature and seriousness of the American threat, 
and the Soviet threat upon which it was based, must first be evaluated. Only after 
considering these respective threats can the Turkish decision and the explanation for 
that decision offered here be completely understood. 
1 1 1  
The American threat was certainly made with the goal of deterring Turkish 
intervention on Cyprus, but it was only a threat in contingency. The contingency, of 
course, was a Soviet invasion of Turkey. At the time, a Soviet move against Turkey 
or any other state in Western Europe was unlikely. At the time the Soviets hadn't 
attempted direct militarily intervention in any state outside of the Communist Bloc, 
and would only do so once during the entire Cold War. Rather than become directly 
involved in disputes of this nature, it was the nature of the Soviets to maintain a low 
profile while providing aid to the party it favored (Hosmer and Wolfe, 155-1 56). 
That the Soviets were unlikely to invade in the event of a Turkish invasion 
was demonstrated several months after the Johnson letter. In August of 1964 
Makarios sent his forces to attack Turkish-Cypriot villages and the Turks responded 
by sending the Turkish air force to strafe Makarios' troops. Following the Turkish air 
attack, Makarios requested Soviet intervention and was rejected (Cohen, 284-285). 
The air strikes were stopped when the UN Security Council asked for a ceasefire. 
Inonu iterated that " . .  . in order to reconfirm Turkey's  respect for the United Nations, 
his government had decided to stop the actions of the Turkish air force over Cyprus" 
(Tamkoc, 275). In September, and in keeping with their traditional method of acting 
in this type of situation, the Soviets did agree to provide Makarios with anti-aircraft 
weapons, but may also have sought to assure the Turks that these weapons would not 
be used offensively against them (Wynfred and Gibert, 22). 
As unlikely as Soviet intervention against Turkey was, the US was just as 
unlikely to refuse to help Turkey if the Soviets did invade. During the 1964 Cyprus 
crisis the US commanded much respect within NATO and was acting in the capacity 
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of the leading member of NATO, but it certainly did not have the power to make decisions without consulting other members. The decision to send a UN peacekeeping force composed of NATO members had been a controversial issue within NATO. Not just Turkey and Greece, but " . . .  other NATO members were also divided over Cyprus and the role NATO should play in resolving the ethnic conflict" (Joseph, 87). If it was difficult for the US to garner support for its position to send a peacekeeping force to Cyprus, how much more difficult would it have been for the US to impose a NATO decision on other treaty members which both violated the law and spirit of the treaty, not to mention jeopardizing the security of all Western Europe. Beyond this, there is another simple and obvious reason that the US would probably not carry out its threat against Turkey. By 1964, it had been for nearly two decades the overarching goal of US foreign policy to keep the Soviets out of Western Europe. While it is completely understandable that the US would use strong measures to prevent a war between two members of the North Atlantic alli ance, it is more than dubious that the US would forfeit the main goal of its foreign policy to punish Turkey. The second part of Johnson's  threat, that Turkey had agreed not to use weapons provided by the United States for any purposes other than defending Turkey from Soviet attack, is questionable on two points. First, because Turkey already possessed the weapons, they could do what they wanted with them and possibly suffer no consequences. The importance of Turkey to US interests, as described above, may have prevented the US from cutting off military aid. On the other hand, the US could very well have discontinued military aid to Turkey, but the Turks could 113 
have bought weapons elsewhere. While it might have been more expensive, the Turks could have purchased weapons from other countries within the Atlantic Alliance such as France and Holland, who have sold weapons to many other countries. The impact of Johnson's threat to suspend aid was at least as strong in a nonmaterial sense as it was in a material sense. This is corroborated by a renowned scholar of Turkish-American relations, who, commenting on the possible US cut off of military aid following Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus, stated that the suspension of US aid " . . .  would leave deep psychological scars. Indeed, it would be this aspect-far more than the physical or economic impact of losing American­supplied equipment and credit-that would haunt the relationship for a long time to come" (Harris 1975: 72). Although it is possible that the Turks decided to give up the idea of invasion because of fears that the Americans would discontinue economic aid to Turkey, there is no conclusive evidence that this was the case. It is true that Turkey was the recipient of much foreign economic assistance, and that the United States provided the major portion of this aid. However, the only specific account of Turkey's foreign policy decision making constraints related to international economic assistance during this period known to the author (Tuncer, 1975) does not mention that economic concerns affected the Inonu government's decision to cancel the invasion of Cyprus. Rather, this article states that the Turks were so satisfied with Turkish-US relations before the crisis that they had never considered the extent to which they were dependent on US economic aid (1975: 224), and that only after the crisis did Turkish intellectuals begin to discuss the extent to which they economically dependent on US 114 
aid. Furthermore, even if the US had made threats concerning the discontinuation of economic aid to Turkey, the reality of the US following through on these threats would have been questionable, just as the likelihood that the US would militarily abandon Turkey in the event of Soviet invasion was questionable. It is interesting to compare Turkey's actions with those of Greece during this period. Both were members of NATO and both were dependent on the US for economic aid. The Greeks did not choose to consult NATO when they made decisions, nor did they announce the measures that they would undertake to bring about a favorable decision on Cyprus. In April 1964, the Greek Cypriots, having numerical superiority, began to push the Turkish Cypriots back, culminating in the Greek Cypriot offensive against Kyrenia Castle in northeast Cyprus. Following the offensive, the Turkish foreign minister told the press that he expected the UN peacekeeping force to increase its efforts at maintaining order on Cyprus (Kosut, 116). Displaying less confidence in the UN, Turkish Cypriots immediately ·asked Turkey for military assistance. The Turks then claimed that their ethnic brethren on Cyprus might suffer "genocide" at the hands of the Greek Cypriots (Davison, 160), but only made threatening gestures and launched no invasion. They did however secretly send some troops to Cyprus. At about this time the Greek Cypriots also asked for Greek assistance. Instead of acting tentatively as the Turks had, the Greeks secretly sent some 10,000 men to Cyprus, many more than the Turks had, for the purpose of organizing and commanding the Greek Cypriots (Joseph, 44). Whereas the Turks advertised their plans and waited for NATO and US approval, the Greeks acted to change the situation on Cyprus in a more independent fashion. 115 
Though not containing conclusive proof of the reason that the Turks cancelled 
their invasion of Cyprus, the correspondence between President Johnson and Prime 
Minister Inonu at the time of the crisis demonstrates the understanding that each party 
had concerning the relationship between the two. In the Johnson letter, the President 
appealed to the Turkish prime minister on grounds of friendship, writing, "I put it to 
you personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your Government, 
in effect, to present a unilateral decision of such consequence to an ally who has been 
such a staunch supporter over the years" (Geyelin, 1 15). Johnson's reference to the 
nature of US-Turkish friendship may possibly indicate his understanding of how 
Turkey viewed the relationship and the advantage that the US had in demanding 
cancellation of the invasion due to the relationship. 
Prime Minister Inonu's communication with Johnson reflected both the 
disillusionment that he felt concerning the nature of the supposed special relationship 
between the two countries and his defense of Turkey's international behavior vis-a­
vis international organizations. Referring to Johnson's suggestion that Turkey might 
intend to invade Cyprus with the goal of sacking the island instead of invading merely 
to protect Turkish compatriots, he stated that: 116 The reason for my sorrow is that our ally, the Government of the United States, could think that Turkey might lay aside the principle constituting the foundation of her foreign policy, i.e., absolute loyalty to international law, commitments and obligations, as factually evidenced in many circumstances well known to the United States (Inonu, 390). 
Further commenting on Turkey's commitment and allegiance to the UN, Inonu claimed that : . . .  Turkey has distinguished herself as one of the most loyal members of the United Nations ever since its foundation. The Turkish people has spared no effort to safeguard the principles of the United Nations Charter, and has even sacrificed hers sons for this cause. Turkey has never failed in supporting this organization and, in order to secure its proper functioning, has borne great moral and material sacrifices even when she had most pressing financial difficulties (Inonu, 392). Inonu's correspondence with Johnson indicates more than just disappointment at being deterred from the invasion of Cyprus, it also reflects the national frustration and rejection that follow from the rebuff of a friend. This may provide an answer to why Turkey did not go ahead and execute its military action against Cyprus. Because the reality of Soviet invasion and American abandonment in that instance were highly improbable, some have remarked that Turkey's decision to abide by American wishes was nai've (Celik 1999: xiii). Instead of being nai've, Turkey may have been simply acting as it had in the past, placating a strong country of the civilization with which Turkey wanted to be associated. Inonu himself was likely to have this attitude, as he was more westernized than past Turkish leaders (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 189- 190) and refused to, " . . .  question the NATO alliance, for to so would have meant questioning the very foundations on which the Turkish regime rested" (Ahmad, 407). That Turkey placed so much value in common membership of international organizations with the United States may have made it even more difficult to 1 1 7 
disregard Johnson's demands. As related in the middle section of this chapter and included in Inonu's correspondence, being part of and acting part of the organizations that affiliated it with the West was the overriding motivation of Turkish foreign policy. That Johnson's threat contained not only American consternation at Turkey's invasion plans but also directly implied that Turkey would be letting NATO down made it doubly likely that Turkey would stand down. The Johnson letter was not made public until after the Turkish elections in 1965. While there is no question that the release of the letter negatively affected Turkish popular opinion towards the United States, it caused only a brief consideration concerning whether Turkey should abandon its Western orientation. The Turks became disillusioned regarding their special bilateral relationship with the US, but still clearly wanted to be part of the Western world. During 1965 the Turkish government began talks with the Soviets leading to a modest warming in relations, but this can be understood of reflecting the overall movement towards detente that was occurring during the middle 1960s (with the exception of Southeast Asia). Instead of joining either the Communist Bloc or moving toward nonalignment, during the late 1960s the Turks began to look toward the European Community to replace close ties with the US, in effect replacing one Western friend with another (Ince, 262). Just as the Turks had earlier been drawn toward a strong friendship with the US for cultural reasons, riow it was drawing closer to l�urope for those same reasons (Tachau, 198). Concerning the Cyprus issue, after 1965 the Turks were careful to maintain their NA TO and the UN membership in good standing (the Turks have been 118 
unsuccessful in gaining EU membership) while still attempting to control events on the island. Instead of going away, the problems between the Turkish and Greek ethnic groups on Cyprus repeatedly flared up during the late sixties and early seventies. In 1967 the Turks again threatened to invade but were dissuaded by the United States and Great Britain. In the early 70s, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit renewed Turkey' s  pledge to NATO with the intention of generally discussing the problems in the Western Alliance, specifically including the Cyprus Crisis (Ince, 280). During 1974, of course, the Turks finally did successfully invade Cyprus. The Turkish public, acutely aware of Turkish timidity in the past, was overjoyed at the undertaking and success of the invasion because it seemed to shatter the Turks' strong inhibitions about acting independently on the world scene (Mango, 44-45). The US attempted to stop the Turks unilaterally, but failed. Circumstances had changed in the decade between the two major Cyprus crises. The timing for the United States could not have been worse as US credibility had been damaged because of Vietnam and because the US foreign policy bureaucracy was not particularly capable of acting in a strong and decisive fashion at the time, due to the Watergate crisis and Nixon's  impending resignation (Kissinger, Chapter 7). Also, as U.S. prestige and influence declined marginally due to Vietnam and Watergate, the United States was not as strong a representative of the Western world, and, hence, NATO. While in 1964 President Johnson's letter had expressed US demands that Turkey halt invasion plans, the specific threat entailed in the letter dealt with the US role as the leader of NATO and spoke of NATO not protecting Turkey, therefore implying that 1 19 
Turkey was causing a general problem within NATO by planning to go to war. For 
the Turks, the 1974 decision was different from the 1964 decision in that " . . . the role 
played by NATO during the 1974 crisis was minimal, if any . . .  " (Joseph, 90). Had 
the United States retained the position that it held before the debacle in Vietnam, the 
United States might have commanded more respect within NATO and therefore been 
successful at deterring Turkey a second time. 
As discussed above, the 1974 Turkish move against Cyprus was a deviation 
from the pattern of Turkish foreign policy that manifested itself both before and after 
the Second World War. During the period from the beginning of the Republic until 
the end of the Cold War, under circumstances where the West was a coherent entity, 
the Turks strongly sought membership in Western based �nternational organizations 
and the approval of the most important members of these organizations. This 
inclination was the outcome of a combination of national culture and the 
contemporary international social environment and was a significant factor in Turkish 
foreign policy decision-making. If Turkey did not actually defer to the Western 
powers in all cases that involved a foreign policy decision-making opportunity, the 
Turks were more concerned with the outlook and objectives of the Western powers 
than most countries that were not historically part of Western civilization. 
This pattern was a product of a centuries old identity problem that manifested itself in 
the need to be affiliated with an established and strong civilization. The Turkish 
decision in 1964 conforms to the pattern of placation of strong countries in the West 
after the First World War and the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Because the 
American threat of NATO abandonment in the event of Soviet attack was a dubious 
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one, it is likely that the Turkish need for acceptance and affiliation by the West was a major factor in the Turkish government's reaction to the Johnson letter. That is not to say that this was the only factor that caused the Turkish government to cancel the invasion of Cyprus, but that Turkey's identity problem and corresponding need for affiliation was a considerable factor in the decision and should not be overlooked or undervalued. The Sino-Vietnamese Border War Historically, Vietnam has been the victim of many border incursions by the Chinese (Gilks, 2-4), but during the period between World War II an the end of the Vietnamese-American War in 1975, China and Vietnam maintained a close relationship in a joint effort to defeat Western imperialism. According to the Chinese, this close relationship began to unravel after the death of Ho Chi Minh. Ho had been very adept at maintaining positive relations between China and the Soviet Union during the first years of the struggle against the United States, but after 1969 no adequate replacement for this role emerged (Pike, 20 1 ) .  The Vietnamese Communist victory in 1975 caused deterioration in this relationship, as the Chinese voiced grievances concerning the victorious communists' treatment of ethnic Chinese living in the former South Vietnam. More importantly, China became nervous about increasingly friendly relations between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The Sino­Soviet split eventually forced the Vietnamese to side with one protector or the other in their search for support from a major power. Vietnam chose the Soviet Union because, "Moscow was very powerful, strongly anti-Chinese, and very far away-121 
therefore the best ally Hanoi could have to preserve its conquests and keep as independent as possible" (Griffith, 141). In 1975 China became the only state to give aid to the new Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia. As China had not been entirely enthusiastic about the reunification of Vietnam, it now hoped to foster a strong Cambodian state to resist Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina (Yahuda, 226). Vietnam countered this by concluding a ''Treaty of Friendship and Solidarity" with Laos in August 1977. This in tum led to a Cambodian military incursion into Vietnam the following month. Beijing received a delegation of Vietnamese leaders in November 1977 with the intent of discussing future relations between the two states, but these talks only led to more disagreement and resulted in the Vietnamese delegation's early departure. In December of that year Vietnam began military operations in Cambodia in response to continuing border violations by Khmer Rouge troops. This initially led to a cut back in economic assistance from China. During July of 1978 China made the decision to discontinue all aid to Vietnam. In November 1978 the Vietnamese leadership signed a "Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship" with the Soviet Union. Although this treaty involved economic assistance and the establishment of refueling bases for Soviet naval vessels, it is clear that the principal intent of this treaty for both parties was the containment and deterrence of China (Zagoria and Simon, 158). Vietnam's historical fears of Chinese encroachment had begun to reassert themselves with the withdrawal of a common enemy, the United States, from Southeast Asia, and the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly uneasy over China's recent diplomatic successes concerning Japan and 122 
the United States. The treaty did not stipulate immediate commitment of military assistance if either party was attacked, neither did it mention any third country. However, both Brezhnev and Le Duan, the Vietnamese head of state, declared that China would have to abide by the treaty's implications (Gilks, 218). Alarmed by the conclusion of the treaty, the Chinese Politburo held a series of meetings beginning on November 15 and lasting through mid-December (Chen, 85). It was at this meeting that Chinese leaders first seriously contemplated the details of a military strike against the Vietnamese, either in Vietnam or in Cambodia. China's top leaders, led by Deng Xiaoping, finally opted for a punitive strike against Vietnam itself rather than intervention in Cambodia. This strike, like the operations discussed above, would not be undertaken with the goal of taking and holding enemy territory but rather to punish Vietnam. Deng was aware of the risks of such an invasion. In making the case for the punitive strike, he outlined several possibilities concerning Soviet intervention that such an operation might provoke. While acknowledging the risks involved, Deng believed that Soviets would only respond in a limited fashion, and that the Chinese would be able to handle these limited attacks (Chen, 87). Feeling protected by their recently concluded agreement, in December 1978 Vietnam commenced with a full-scale invasion of Cambodia. Vietnamese troops quickly overwhelmed Khmer Rouge forces and secured Phnom Penh, setting up a new government. China first responded by issuing a joint communique with the United States stating opposition to Vietnamese domination of Indochina. During late January and early February Deng visited the United States to complete the normalization of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the PRC. In discussions 123 
with President Carter and other U.S. leaders, Deng told them that China would launch a limited attack against Vietnam (Carter, 206). Carter advised against such an attack but could not dissuade Deng from his decision to go through with the planned invasion. Deng' s  visit to the United States prompted much criticism within Vietnam, and ships from the Soviet navy began moving into the South China Sea near Hainan Island. On February 8 the Soviets to warn the Beijing against " . . .  overstepping the forbidden line . . .  " (Hsu, 825). This warning went unheeded. On February 16, the day before the invasion was scheduled, Chinese leaders met in Beijing to confer about the prospects of coming operation. Deng Xiaoping led the discussion and addressed the issue of Soviet intervention. While he thought that Soviet forces along the Manchurian border might harass Chinese troops, " . . .  Deng assured his listeners that it was unlikely that they would carry out either a large scale invasion on multiple fronts or an invasion on a single front" (Ross, 230). In other words, Deng believed that the Soviets would act similarly to the way they had done during the Ussuri River confrontation of 1969. In the early hours of February 17, 1979, the PLA unleashed an artillery barrage and Chinese tanks crossed the Vietnamese border shortly thereafter with the intent, in the words of Deng Xiaoping, of "teaching Vietnam a lesson." The invading force was reportedly composed of several hundred thousand men. Chinese forces advanced ten kilometers on the first day and about half that distance again on the second day. During the first two days the Vietnamese were severely outnumbered, as only about 50,000 Vietnamese troops with little combat experience were stationed near the Sino-Vietnamese border. On the third day Vietnamese resistance stiffened 124 
and both sides sought to reinforce their armies. By February 20 the level of fighting 
had increased and the Chinese military objective, the capture of Lang Son, became 
apparent. 
The remainder of the first week involved action in or around Lang Son. The 
Chinese took the village of Lao Cai, about 25 kilometers inside the border as the 
Vietnamese continued to shift forces from Cambodia to the northern front. From Lao 
Cai the Chinese launched repeated attacks on Lang Son, sometimes entering the city 
itself, only to repeatedly pushed back by the Vietnamese. At the end of the first week 
the Chinese opened a second offensive in the southeast with the idea of cutting off the 
Vietnamese troops in the Lang Son region. 
As the second week began it was becoming apparent that the Chinese were 
becoming bogged down and would have difficulty achieving the limited military 
goals they it had set, taking Lang Son and destroying some front line Vietnamese 
divisions. During the second week the Chinese drove as far forty kilometers inside 
Vietnam, but the Vietnamese began making incursions into China at other points 
along the border forcing the Chinese to reconsider their plans. Seeking to find a way 
to declare victory and then get out, the Chinese sent further reinforcements to Lang 
Son and launched stronger artillery barrages in hopes of taking the entire town before 
declaring the operation over and retreating. However, by this time some of the best 
Vietnamese divisions were arriving to defend Lang Son (up to this point the Chinese 
had been fighting against divisions with lesser combat experience and capability). 
After several more days of heavy fighting, the Chinese promptly announced that they 
would pull back to the original Vietnamese Border and began to slowly withdraw 
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having failed to achieve any of their military goals. Although the Chinese claimed that they had decimated several top Vietnamese divisions, this was clearly not the case (Chen, 113-115). The Chinese withdrawal began on March 5 and was completed on March 16. Each side claimed to have killed more of the enemy than the other, so actual casualty figures are difficult to estimate but it has been generally established that the total number of dead on both sides numbered between sixty and seventy thousand with an equal amount of wounded. (Chen, 113-115; Jacobsen, 103). As the war ended it was clear that the Vietnamese were gaining strength while whatever capabilities the Chinese had demonstrated at the outset of the war were beginning to ebb. As more well trained, better equipped, and more experienced Vietnamese troops were on the way to the area around Lang Son it is possible that the Chinese could have suffered a more serious defeat had they not began their withdrawal when they did. If the strength of the Vietnamese was not enough, the threat of Russian intervention constantly hung in the air throughout the war. The USSR repeatedly warned the Chinese that Soviet forces would intervene if the Chinese did not pull back. On February 18 Moscow demanded that the Chinese get out of Vietnam while there was still time and on the next day US sources reported that the USSR was pondering a limited invasion of China (Jacobsen, 98). On the fifth day of the war, the twenty-first, Russian planes flew over the area of battle, additional ships joined the Soviet naval task force operating in the South China Sea, and a Soviet military delegation flew to Hanoi. On February 22, the Soviet Deputy Defense Minister in Moscow and the Soviet military attache in Hanoi both made statements, the essence 126 
of which was that the Soviet Union would act to fulfill its treaty obligations to Vietnam if the Chinese did not promptly withdraw (Chen, 109). As the second week began Soviet ships reached Haiphong harbor with a shipment of missiles and Soviet aircraft began to airlift aid into Vietnam. The Soviets only began to lessen pressure on China as it began to appear likely that the Vietnamese could handle the Chinese without help. Still, even as late as the end of the second week of hostilities Pravda was claiming that the war might "expand" if the Chinese did not promptly withdraw (Jacobsen, 102). From a strictly military point of view, it is difficult to see why China went through with its punitive mission against Vietnam. The PLA was far from a modern force, and many of its problems came to light during the month long conflict. These problems included the ability to coordinate attacks (PLA artillery fired on PLA infantry), to adequately estimate resources needed for operations (PLA tanks ran out of fuel), and to communicate effectively (outdated radio communications, inability to of troops to recognize commanding officers due to absence of rank insignia on uniforms) (Short, 332). Simply taking on the Vietnamese alone was a difficult task, as they had much more recent combat experience and more modern equipment, but the Chinese also had to be prepared for the contingency of Soviet intervention. For this reason one must look beyond the balance of military power to comprehend why the Chinese did attack Vietnam. Concerning the questions of Western military experts about the prudence of Chinese operations against Vietnam: They failed to see that China felt both humiliated and betrayed in its rejection by a former supplicant of favors, and that the feeling 
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of betrayal was exacerbated by Vietnam's growing arrogance toward China and other smaller neighbors, as well as by its alignment with Russia. Such open hostility, the Chinese felt, had to be dealt with, or China's credibility would be at stake. Deng also wanted to show the world that China did not fear war or the threat of Soviet intervention (Hsu, 827). Another commentator claims that China undertook the invasion of Vietnam in order to ' . . .  demonstrate China's regional military power, and implicitly to reassert the traditional Chinese prerogative of "chastising the barbarians" within the traditional areas of Chinese hegemony' (Jencks, 803). The Chinese approach to crisis on its borders was both brutal and delicate. On most occasions the Chinese acted aggressively, seeking to draw blood from their enemies while sacrificing many of their own soldiers, as the Sino-Vietnamese War particularly demonstrated. Yet for all their aggressiveness in these situations, the Chinese were careful to not go too far. Whether they could realistically press their gains, as against the Indians in 1962, or not, as was true of the Korean War and the confrontations with the Soviet Union, the Chinese retreated once limited objectives had been achieved. The show of power demonstrated China's ability to dictate the situation while simultaneously showing that China was prudent enough not to take on more than she could handle. The Chinese withdrawal from Vietnam conformed to this pattern. Deng and his fellow leaders had no intention of permanently holding any Vietnamese territory and planned to retreat once several military objectives had been accomplished. It can be argued that the Chinese were compelled to retreat. Lebow and Stein ( 1990) define compellence as a situation in which " . . .  threats mad by those identified as defenders 128 
were designed to stop an adversary from something it was already doing . . .  ( 1990: 
362). While the Chinese refused to be deterred, they could be compelled to retreat, 
and the strength of the Vietnamese combined with the recurring Russian threats may 
have compelled the PLA to wind down the war for fear of suffering a substantial 
defeat before they attained all of their military goals. Compellence, however, should 
not be confused with deterrence. 
That fact that China may have been compelled to retreat does not mean that 
the Chinese were not risk acceptant. The Chinese approach reflected China' s need to 
see itself as a great power and also its limited military potential. In the militarily 
charged environment of the twentieth century, the way to demonstrate great power 
status was to engage in military conflict with other great powers. The Chinese did 
this at almost every opportunity, sending their armies into action against American, 
Soviet, Indian, and Vietnamese forces within a period of thirty years. While the 
Chinese withdrew after a limited amount of action, with all these confrontations came 
the possibility of uncontrolled escalation in which China could not match the power 
of the Soviets or the Americans. The Chinese were ready to accept these risks. 
Deng Xiaoping' s decision to invade Vietnam involved considerable risks. 
The PLA' s state of readiness for such an undertaking was certainly in question, owing 
to the fact that much of its weaponry was out of date and that it had not been involved 
in an operation of this nature since the early sixties. That Deng and other senior 
leaders were fearful of encirclement by the Soviet Union and its allies is completely 
understandable, but this does not mean an operation like the one against Vietnam was 
the only solution to this problem. China's one strength vis-a-vis the Vietnamese and 
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Russians was the sheer number of men it could put into battle, but this strength would 
have been better employed in a defensive undertaking such as the People's War 
strategy, the strategy that China supposedly preferred over all others. However, 
waiting for the enemy to take the initiative was did not conform to China's cultural 
need to feel that it was a great power, nor did it conform to revolutionary Marxist 
tenets. One can only understand why China acted as it did by understanding these 
cultural and social factors. 
Comparing the Decisions 
It is in the comparison of the two cases of immediate extended deterrence that 
the strength of cultural influence on foreign policy decision-making is most clearly 
illustrated. Because these cases are comparable some standard of equal condition is 
established that allows us to isolate the respective cultural traits and patterns of the 
Turks and Chinese that had important implications for the decisions reached in the 
cases. As with all cases of immediate extended deterrence, these cases involved 
responses to threats. It is in the divergent nature of the responses to the threats that 
cultural influences are demonstrated. 
The American threat to abandon the Turks if the Turkish invasion of Cyprus 
provoked Soviet intervention has been analyzed above. To briefly summarize, 
President Johnson informed the Turks that if they did not immediately cease 
preparations for invasion, the United States would encourage all other members of 
NATO to allow Turkey to be overrun by Soviet forces should the Soviets choose to 
take advantage of the situation. The hollowness of this threat was also related in 
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Chapter IV. It was extremely unlikely that the contingency under which the threat 
was applicable, a Soviet advance over the Turkish border, would take place. In the 
years since the Second World War the Soviets had not directly intervened in a non­
Communist state, and this was even more unlikely in the middle 1960s when Cold 
War tensions in Europe were beginning soften . 
However, in the unlikely event that Soviets did exploit a conflict between 
Greece and Turkey and made the decision to move on Turkey, it is even more 
unlikely that the Americans would have remained outside the fray. Soviet success in 
such a venture would mean control of the Europe' s  southwestern flank and a much­
increased presence in the Mediterranean. The guiding American policy for the era, 
containment of communism, would have been in danger of unraveling had the US 
refused to aid Turkey in the event of Soviet invasion. 
Despite the unlikelihood that the contingency, Soviet invasion, for the 
American threat would develop and the even less likely circumstance that the US 
would make good on its threat of abandonment if a Soviet invasion did take place, the 
Turks knuckled under and accepted Johnson's direction . The central question is why 
they did so. While the Turks may have had an inadequate number of landing craft 
and lacked experience in amphibious warfare, this had not prohibited them from 
making invasion preparations. Only with the arrival of the Johnson letter did the 
Turks decide to cancel the invasion . The Turkish decision only makes since when 
understood within the greater pattern of Turkish foreign policy decision making that 
began with the establishment of the Turkish Republic but was related to much older, 
traditional ways of dealing with the rest of the world. 
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It is inadequate to simply state that the Turks were timid in this instance and chalk it up the fickle nature of human affairs. The Turkish decision represents a lack of capacity to act independently on the world scene that had been a characteristic of Turkish interaction in the world for at least a thousand years. This characteristic was cultural in nature because it grew out of the larger social and historical environment in which the Turks had existed. From the time the first Turkish tribes had began their westward migration from the steppes of Central Asia, they had carried with them a sense of dislocation and a corresponding desire for stability that could only be gained through affiliation. After much wandering and experimentation they finally settled into their role as the military guardians of the Ottoman Empire, only to see that empire go into decline and ultimately collapse. When forced to assert their independence or be scattered to the ends of the earth, the Turks successfully fought to maintain their collective identity, but still looked for larger bonds of affiliation. The superiority of Western civilization and its modem form of social attachment, the international organization, provided the opportunity for the Turks to fulfill what was for them a natural role on the world scene. Only by understanding this larger context can the decision by the Inonu government in 1964 be completely comprehended. The Turks had repeatedly shown more concern over the wider foreign policy objectives of Western international organizations than over issues that specifically affected Turkey. This pattern began was initiated when the Turks imposed economic sanctions on Italy, thereby damaging economic relations between Italy and Turkey, at the behest of the League of Nations during the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935. Following the Second World War, the Turks sent troops to participate in the Korean War, 132 
leading not only to Turkish casualties on the battlefield but to domestic problems caused by the Bulgaria's  ejection of 200,000 ethnic Turks. In the late 1950s, the Turks volunteered to base nuclear missiles on their territory, something that other members of NATO refused to do. This made Turkey a likely target for a Soviet nuclear strike in the event of a nuclear war between the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Turks customarily accepted burdens and risks for the sake of maintaining good standing within Western international organizations, and the decision to refrain from invading Cyprus in the summer of 1964 is one more instance in this pattern. The Turkish decision is brought into high relief when compared with the Chinese decision to disregard Soviet threats and proceed with its plans to punish Vietnam. The Soviet threat against the Chinese was vague, but it involved the possibility of a two front war at a time when China was not in a particularly strong position to face an international crisis. As related in Chapter V, Deng Xiaoping expected the Soviets to harass Chinese troops on the Manchurian border. In other words, Deng was ready to accept possibility of Chinese forces being involved in hostilities on both its northern and southern borders. This decision has much in common with decisions that were _made during Mao's rule. In 1950 the Chinese exposed themselves to large degree of risk by entering the Korean War. China entered the war with the knowledge that it was exposing itself to the possibility of American bombing of Chinese cities and American support of an invasion of the Chinese mainland by the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan. By entering the war the Chinese Communists were putting all that they 133 
had won during the revolution in jeopardy. While the Chinese decision to strike 
against India in 1962 involved little initial risk, once again it did involve the 
possibility of a two front war as relations between the Soviets and Indians had been 
growing increasingly positive during the early 1960s. The Chinese decision to 
engage Soviet forces along the Manchurian border in 1969 demonstrated a greater 
ability to accept risk. The Chinese were ready for the war to escalate to the highest 
level, this borne out by the fact that the Chinese had built an underground city in 
Beijing to be used in the event to Soviet nuclear attack. Understood within the 
context of these decisions, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 seems to be a 
typical foreign policy encounter for China during the postwar era, regardless of the 
degree of risk involved. 
Deng's decision to accept this possibility was made with the knowledge that the 
People's  Liberation Army was militarily inferior to the opposition forces that it might 
have to face. Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 many senior 
military officers had been purged and the army had been more involved in restoring 
and maintaining domestic peace than preparing for war. While China had improved 
its nuclear arsenal to some degree since its first successful atomic test in 1964, the 
Chinese nuclear arsenal still paled in comparison to that of the Soviets. The gap 
between the conventional capabilities of the Chinese and the Russians and 
Vietnamese was also great. Since the Cultural Revolution China had done very little 
to modernize its conventional forces, while the Russians had continually updated their 
conventional capabilities and also supplied North Vietnamese Army with modem 
equipment. The Chinese were able to escape a two front war by pulling out of 
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Vietnam before Soviet intervention, but the Chinese had no way of being completely 
sure at what point the Soviets would decide that enough was enough. Therefore, it is 
extremely plausible to suggest that Deng's decision to go forward with the invasion 
of Vietnam in the face of Soviet warnings not to do so can be understood as part of a 
pattern of contemporary Chinese foreign policy that was rooted in much older aspects 
of Chinese culture. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
Although national culture is only one of many influences on foreign policy 
decision-making, it should not be overlooked. Because it is difficult to isolate culture 
as factor influencing policy, many have done just that. However, by assessing state 
actions over time, the cultural variable can be brought into focus. Describing culture 
and foreign policy in Belgium and the Netherlands, Marijke Breuning states that, 
" . . .  observed patterns of behavior across time and cross-nationally can lead to the 
conclusion that state A's foreign policy behavior is bounded in one way, while state 
B's is constrained another way" (1997: 104). This is exactly what the foregoing 
chapters have sought to demonstrate. 
The Turks and the Chinese have historically had very different conceptions of 
the part that they should play on the world scene. Despite the Turks' power within 
the Ottoman Empire, the Turks found more legitimacy in the religion, traditions, and 
language of the other groups within the empire, the Arabs and Persians, than in their 
own. While the First World War shattered the Ottoman Empire, the Turks continued 
to look to other countries to define themselves. The Chinese, on the other hand, 
were completely secure, perhaps overly secure, within their cultural tradition. China 136 
found it very difficult to believe that any other state could rival it in terms of government and culture. It is for this reason that the Chinese experience with modernization has been so painful. The First World War marked a watershed in world history and international relations. As the war drew to close the importance of international ideology and international organizations became apparent. These concepts affected the international outlook of all states and presented a way for states to update their traditional methods of dealing with the world. Turkey and China were no exception. During the twentieth century, Turkey consistently identified itself with the Western powers, sometimes to its own detriment. Turkey's experience with the League of Nations, the Korean War, the gaining of NATO membership, the installation of NATO missiles on Turkish soil, and other incidents all demonstrate that the Turks were ready to make the interests of leading countries of the West Turkey's interests, even if these powerful countries were less than willing to reciprocate. By contrast, the Chinese repeatedly attempted to demonstrate that they could operate independently and aggressively in the international arena, even if they had not reached the level of economic and military modernization that the leading Western states and the Soviet Union had. Chinese intervention in the Korean War, invasion of India, and the military operations that the Chinese undertook on the Soviet border all serve to illustrate this tendency. Turkey's decision to heed American threats and back down from invading Cyprus in 1964 and China's invasion of Vietnam in spite of Soviet warnings not to do so in l979 bring culture's effect on foreign policy into sharper focus. China was 137 
certainly more powerful than Turkey, but it faced the same circumstances, a 
superpower warning not to go forward with an invasion of a third party state. 
Moreover, the risks for the Chinese in 1979 were greater than those of the Turks in 
1979. Regarding the American threats to abandon Turkey in the event of a Soviet 
intervention and discontinue military support, the Soviets were unlikely to intervene 
in a clash between the Turks and Greeks over Cyprus and even more unlikely that the 
United States would not react to this contingency, and the Turks could have 
purchased arms elsewhere. The Chinese faced a possible two front war if they went 
through with their punitive attack against Vietnam. Turkey was risk averse and 
tentative in 1964 because challenging the United States was unthinkable for a state 
that attached so much of its identity to being friends with the United States and being 
part of Western international organizations. The Chinese were more risk acceptant 
and more inclined toward independent action in 1979 because of the way that China 
had traditionally viewed the world, that is, that China was a great power and should 
act accordingly. 
Looking Forward 
The rapid chain of events that occurred between 1989 and 1992, the Soviet 
withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, marked the end of the global ideological conflict that began during 
the closing years of the First World War. The triumphant West, led by the United 
States, looked to promote democratization in former Communist countries, expand 
export markets, and increase the power and membership of international 138 
organizations based on Western principles, such as the World Trade Organization. In the years immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc there were hopes that end of capitalist/communist conflict might also mean the end of warfare itself. While these hopes were quickly extinguished, it was still abundantly clear that the post-Cold War world was very different from the world before 1989. More than a decade has passed and the characteristics that may define this new era of international relations are slowly coming into focus. Nation-states have demonstrated an increased interest in economic power. This has led to the development of more supranational organizations for the purpose of regulating international trade, causing states to look for new avenues for cooperation and adopt similar political and economic institutions. However, economic competition is still just that, competition. Even if all states should become capitalist and democratic, they still have some mutually exclusive interests, such as the need for access to scarce resources. If not properly managed, there is a continuing possibility that economic conflict may degenerate into violent conflict. Also, with the demise of ideology as a motivating force, older forms of rivalry began to assert themselves. During the 1990s groups within the same state and in different states went to war over ethnic and religious issues, the prime examples being the war in Southern Europe and the intertribal conflict in East Africa. Stateless groups have increasingly resorted to violence in hopes of gaining wider attention for their demands. This has happened despite the fact that the US holds a tremendous advantage in military power because US resources, however great, are still limited. Rather than being a period in which violent conflict occurred much less frequently as 139 
some hoped during the immediate post-Cold War years, the new era of international relations increasingly looks as if it will be defined by issues of economics and ethnicity, and without wisdom and patience these issues will have the same ability to produce violent conflict as did ideology. These changes in the international system have caused corresponding changes in the foreign policies of states, including those of Turkey and China. The Turks still seek to become more integrated into the West, but the role they play had been altered by new circumstances. Instead of guarding the southern frontier of the Soviet Union, the Turks now look to advance Western interests in the Middle East. Turkey was a major staging area for coalition forces during the Gulf War. It also provides diplomatic and intelligence links between the US and European powers and Middle Eastern states. Potentially more important is the fact that Turkey is the oldest secular and democratic state with a primarily Islamic population. Turkey may be the model to which moderate Islamic states in the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, and South Asia aspire (Celik, 122). While the Turks are certain to have continuing identity problems, foreign policies that encourage Islamic governments to become more Western in their orientation will both increase Turkey' s  value within the West and erode some of the differences between the West and the Middle East that are the root of Turkey' s  identity concerns. The collapse of the Soviet Union also caused a transition in Chinese foreign policy. That China is still striving to attain great power status, a status that Chinese believe their state rightfully deserves, has been confirmed by both Chinese and Western scholars (Wang 1999, Deng 1999, Harris 2000). However, in keeping with 140 
the new circumstances since the end of the Cold War the Chinese have undertaken a 
broader range of methods to achieve this status. Economic reforms begun in the 
1980s were accelerated in the early 1990s with the establishment of special economic 
zones that encourage foreign investment. China also sought membership in more 
international organizations and attempted to become a more responsible power in the 
eyes of the world. Furthermore, China has not undertaken any military action outside 
its borders during the post-Cold War era. While the Chinese have placed a high 
priority on the modernization of its military forces and occasionally threatened their 
use, they have been much more conservative in their foreign policy statements and 
behavior since the demise of the charged ideological confrontation of the Cold War. 
Implications 
With regards to the implications of this study, a brief word concerning the 
importance of this study for general social science will be briefly discussed first. 
Then the implications for international relations theory and the practice of foreign 
policy will be related. 
Concerning social science in general, this study demonstrates a way to 
overcome the separation between two basic categories of inquiry within social 
science, nomothetic and ideographic. As related in Chapter I, nomothetic science 
rests on three basic assumptions (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 5-7). First, social 
science is capable of producing general statements by means of finding general 
patterns. Also, scientific theory should employ deductive logic. Finally, causal 
relationships can be derived by discovering spatio-temporal relationships between 
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events. Ideographic research, on the other hand, isolates a concrete unit of analysis and asserts that the internal dialectic of this unit is unique and cannot be found elsewhere (Galtung: 108). This division between nomothetic and ideographic research largely corresponds to the dividing line between the separate fields of history and anthropology. Historians are concerned with change over time whereas anthropologists focus on a specific community of people during a specific period of time and try to discern the essence of that community. This division limits the amount of understanding that could potentially be gained in any historical, anthropological, sociological, or political enquiry. By seeking to understand how societal values are transformed in action over time, a deeper and more sophisticated understanding of both the nature of specific societies and the nature of change can be gained. A method similar to the one used in this study could be employed to study almost any type of group or groups (national, provincial, local) and how these groups reacted to changing circumstances. Another important implication that this study suggests pertains to the relationship between leadership and culture. Both of the cases analyzed in this study describe decisions that conformed to earlier decision making patterns. These patterns extended beyond the tenure of any one leader, but it must be admitted that certain leaders, Ataturk and Mao in the cases presented here, inaugurated these patterns. Though neither Ataturk nor Mao was democratically elected, they were able to take and maintain power because each at some level understood the desires and nature of his people. What is more, they were able to understand that the international 142 
environment either was changing or had changed, and that they must find a way to update or modernize the ideas and sentiments of their respective nations. This was the only way that identity could be retained. To simply cling to the old would mean a future without hope, but to completely abandon tradition would mean the destruction of identity. In this sense Mao and Ataturk can be compared with Ho Chi Minh, for, "In times of crisis the Vietnamese looked for a particular kind of leader. A Hitler or a Joseph McCarthy or an Abraham Lincoln would have had no success in Vietnam, for they did not conform to the model laid down in the depths of Vietnamese history" (Fitzgerald, 30). This study also contains important implications for general international relations theory. In his chapter "Conclusion: The End of the Cold War-What Have We Learned?" Richard Hermann claims that international relations theory after the Cold War suffers from the same problems that it did before the demise of the Soviet Union. He believes that international relations theorists continue to separate themselves into two separate camps, one group that relies on structural assumptions regarding the international system and a second group that is only concerned with foreign policy decision-making (1995: 277). Herman argues that these two groups have not been particularly receptive to each other' s  ideas, nor has either group been as effective as it might at developing the type of theory that each considers to be within its area of expertise. To overcome these deficiencies, Hermann first advocates the reintegration of area specialists into the process of building middle level international relations theory (1995: 278). By using information provided by area specialists, international 143 
relations theorists will have a better empirical basis for understanding the type of patterns certain states are likely to conform to in their international behavior. Hermann then states that once this has been accomplished the " . .  . international system would thus be operationally defined not only by the distribution of material power bases among the great powers but also by the distribution of interests and aims." (1995: 278). The present study not only attempts to overcome these deficiencies of international relations theory that Hermann identifies, but also seeks to demonstrate how to go beyond Hermann's recommendations for improving international relations theory. Hermann claims that by marrying structural ideas concerning capabilities to an understanding of how states' conceive the world is the answer to curing the long standing sickness of international relations theory. This study certainly attempts to account for the specific international outlooks of individual states and where these specific understandings originate. While not focusing on capabilities, this project certainly does not exclude discussion of capabilities. Undoubtedly, as even Wendt has remarked, " . . .  the distribution and composition of material capabilities at any given moment help define the possibilities of our action" (1999: 113). The cases included in this study were chosen because they illustrate the weakness of relying solely on capability ratios, but for this very reason capability ratios had to be compared with other factors influencing decision making in these specific cases and were found wanting. What Hermann does not allow for are any types of international social factors other than those based on the perception of material capabilities. Hermann claims 144 
that international relations theory is not culpable for its failure to explain the end of 
the Cold War ( 1995: 279). He does this because his recommendations for improving 
international relations theory are incomplete. Although the salience of capabilities 
was not the objective of this study, they are undoubtedly important. This truth is 
matched by the importance of the specific ways the groups of people that inhabit 
individual states see the world. But beyond these two factors there is a third that 
should not be overlooked. Herman believes that international relations theory could 
not predict the end of the Cold War because the Cold War, according to him, could 
not and cannot be defined as a single entity ( 1995 : 279). In contrast, this study 
attempts to show that not just the Cold War but rather the entire period from the end 
of the First World War until 1989, as related in chapter two, was a single entity. This 
entity was based on certain social characteristics of the international system, and by 
understanding how these systemic social characteristics interact with capabilities and 
area specific perspectives, we can understand more about both the nature of the 
international system and why certain international events occur. 
The Turkish and Chinese cases explained in chapters four and five 
demonstrate how countries update the practice of their cultural values and 
understandings of their place in the world according to social changes in the 
international system. Cultural essence survives through the process of evolution, and 
this evolution is a process that is punctuated by shifts in the international social 
system. When events trigger a radical change in the international social system, 
states must react by applying traditional perspectives to new circumstances. What 
emerges is a different form of foreign policy practice, but one that is still based on 
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certain constant ideas about a state's international role. The very fact that states are embarking on different courses of foreign policy practice, such as the Turkish move to join the West or the Chinese tendency to use force in international confrontations during the period discussed in this study, should indicate that a transition in the international social system is occurring. One of the great weaknesses of international relations theory has been its inability to foresee changes on the international scene. Nothing demonstrated this inability more than the collapse of the Soviet Union and the corresponding end of the Cold War. The theory presented in this study, on the other hand, represents a dynamic perspective on international relations. While the cases studies related in chapters five and six are accounts of decisions that conform to continuous patterns, these patterns are temporally limited manifestations of traditional values that have been held for many centuries. These manifestations took the form the forms described in chapters four and five because of the changes in the international systems that came about during the First World War. The altering of intemational forms of organization and thought that were wrought by the First World War was related to many changes taking place in the world before the war. While these changes were triggered by the war, they were the result of developments in technological, organizational, and philosophical fields (which are extremely difficult to separate) before the war. Political change was precipitated by changes in general social and technological environment. It may be that this is true not just of the First World War but also of other eras of international history. By gaining an understanding of changes in areas outside of but related to 146 
international politics those scholars trying to understand transition in international 
politics may at the very least be able to articulate the types of conditions that might 
favor a general alteration in the social nature of the international system. 
While international relations scholars should be seeking to understand the 
nature of the international social environment and how and when this environment 
experiences transformation, this does not mean that they should be looking for or 
expecting the advent of a more humane and pacific era of international relations. 
Every era of international history will have both better and worse circumstances 
compared to the eras that both precede and follow it. The era that this study analyzed, 
the period between the First World War and the end of the Cold War, experienced 
violence and warfare on an unprecedented scale yet also experienced the demise of 
colonialism and impressive advances in the area of international organization. The 
post-Cold war period, about which we can only begin (but we can begin) to speculate, 
has certainly experienced a significant decrease in the threat of nuclear war on a large 
scale while also witnessing an alarming increase in international terrorism. The 
world is never going to be completely free of problems, but a better understanding of 
the types of problems at present and on the horizon will enable us to deal more 
effectively with them when they do occur. 
In this regard, this study can be understood as an attempt to repudiate 
structural (neo )realism but to confirm the wisdom of classical realism. Classical 
realists have generally acknowledged the social nature of international relations. The 
classical realist outlook is well characterized by the statement that: 
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Realism ultimately agrees that the 'necessitous' elements of the international system are largely social constructions generated by human practices, but it retains an ambivalence about human motivations which dictates a skeptical position towards the possibility of overcoming estrangement (Murray, 194). After all, classical realists have been among the most adept social scientists in the area of understanding and predicting change. Two obvious examples are Rheinhold Niebuhr and George Kennan. Writing in the early thirties, Niebhur [1960 (1932)] foresaw many international and domestic developments that would come to pass in later decades. Among these was the inevitability of another Franco-German war [1960 (1932): 110], the coming of a bipolar world in which the East would be dominated by communism while the West would coalesce around the idea of the democratic welfare state (191), and the nature of American civil rights movement during the 1950s and 1960s (252-254). What is most interesting about these predictions is that Niebuhr made them in the face of the prevailing social wisdom of · the day. During the late 1920s and early 1930s many who were interested in 
international affairs believed that another European war was unlikely and that the most developed nations were the ones most likely to adopt communism. Niebuhr was capable of making these predictions because he understood the societal characteristics of individual states in conjunction with the social characteristics of the international system during that time. Similarly, through his understanding of Russian culture and history and the nature of communist ideology, Kennan correctly anticipated how the Cold War would end. For more than forty years Kennan maintained that the US need only remain firm 148 
but patient and history itself would be the undoing of the Soviet Union (Kennan 1987: 
14). Kennan held to this prescription while other strategies for dealing with the 
Soviets, such as Dulles' idea of rolling back Soviet gains in Eastern Europe or ideas 
of pre-empting a "certain" Soviet attack with a nuclear strike, came and went. 
By combining an understanding of social nature of the international system 
and cultures of specific states, international scholars, and especially those with a 
classical real orientation, can offer useful explanations, predictions, and prescriptions 
for the present century just as Niebuhr and Kennan did for the last. If globalization is 
to be one of the defining social characteristics of the international system in the new 
century, then social scientists must make every effort to understand what forms 
globalization will take. Classical realists have an important role to play in this task. 
While globalization could be understood as overcoming the estrangement among 
nations on which much of realism is based, it can also be understood as just one more 
period of international history during which states develop new forms of cooperation 
but are still confronted with the age old questions of international politics. Just as 
some norms and practices may become increasingly standardized the world over, the 
citizens of nation-states may become more instead of less identified with the national 
society of which they are a part. This is because: 
The nation . . .  becomes represented through a set of more or 
less coherent images and memories which deals with the 
crucial questions of the origins, difference and distinctiveness 
of a people. In this sense it has a quasi-religious basis, as it is 
able to answer some of the questions of theodicy in a world 
which is subject to processes of secularization (Featherstone, 
109). 
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Recent expressions of nationalist sentiment in China, the Middle East, and even 
Western Europe have demonstrated this trend during the best of economic times of 
the late 1990s. By seeking to gain an understanding of what types of issues and 
situations will bring states into cooperation or conflict during an age of globalism, 
realists can make an invaluable contribution to our general comprehension of what 
the international system will be like in future decades. 
Now, this being said, it is certainly easier to describe these types of 
developments in hindsight. It is much easier to understand the social nature of the 
international system in 1952 from the perspective of 2002 than it was from the 
perspective of 1952. Patterns of activity occur over time, and only by having time to 
observe them can we identify them as patterns. Moreover, due to unique 
circumstances some societies may not be able to maintain pattern like behavior in 
their foreign policies. Although all national policies and actions are based to some 
extent on local culture and experience, states that have endured dramatic upheaval 
such as being defeated in war and subsequently occupied may alter the way they 
express their cultural heritage because they have no choice. (For a more in depth 
consideration of this phenomenon see Eckstein 1988). Here, I am thinking of the 
defeated fascist states after World War II. Germany and Japan, occupied by the 
victorious powers (particularly the US, which even today maintains bases in these 
countries) gave up militarism and instead focused almost solely on economic growth. 
Nevertheless, by understanding the historical perspectives that specific 
societies hold and thinking about them in conjunction with the new type of social 
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forms that define the present international system our speculation may be much better 
informed. It is toward these types of goals that international relations scholars should 
be working. 
The importance of this undertaking should not be underestimated. It is the 
duty of international relations scholars to articulate the different forms that the 
international future might take. Anything less is an abdication of responsibility. This 
is exceedingly more important than the type of activities that many international 
relations scholars are presently involved, which often amount to research that is 
undertaken for the purpose of impressing colleagues within the field rather than 
affecting anything that goes on outside of the academic world. It is unquestionably 
true that international relations scholars should be assessing the impact of trade flows 
and capability ratios, but they must also pursue the type of research advocated in this 
study. 
This means that international relations scholars must become more concerned 
and involved with the practice of foreign policy, an area for which this study also has 
implications. One of the main objectives of this study has been to demonstrate that 
national culture constrains foreign policy decision-making. Because this is the case, 
this information has the potential to be very relevant for American foreign policy 
decision makers and analysts. In his attempt to narrow the divide between 
international relations theory and foreign policy, George claims that, ''To deal 
effectively with other states, policymakers need what is often referred to as a correct 
image of the opponent" ( 1993 : 125). To obtain this correct image, George advocates 
developing actor specific models to be employed by decision makers when needed. 
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In other words, social scientists can make a contribution in the area of national policy by studying the culture, ideology, and outlook of individual countries. When a crisis arises involving a particular country, this base of information may be invaluable to the responsible officials who must make decisions. Foreign policy decisions involving deterrence are especially important for the United States. This is so because the US is the only remaining superpower and has an interest in maintaining the existing international order that is beneficial for US security and economic interests. As the strongest member of the international community, the US plays an important role in almost all international issues and develops relationships with many different countries. Therefore, it is only normal that at times American interests wil l  clash with those of other states. When this happens the US seeks to resolve issues with a minimum use of force so that the integrity of the existing international order, an order that is favorable to the pursuit of American interests, wi ll not come into question. An increased understanding of how other countries will act and to what types of offers or threats they will respond can make the practice of deterrence more effective. This study and others like it represent a significant way to develop this type of information. The principle aim of this study has been to demonstrate that the combined influence of national culture and temporally limited social characteristics of the international system have a strong ability to constrain foreign policy decision making. It is hoped that other social scientists interested in foreign policy studies and international relations theory wil l  make use of the general model used in this study. That is not to say that others need to adhere to the specific details of the model as employed here. 152 
The starting and ending dates on periods of international history and the specific 
social characteristics that define them are open for interpretation . Possibly shorter or 
longer periods with different overriding social characteristics may yield more 
interesting insights than those offered here. Perhaps an additional unit of analysis, the 
individual leader' s psychological makeup, could be integrated into the model with the 
object of gaining greater understanding concerning specific instances of foreign 
policy decision-making. What is more certain is that researchers using models with 
more than one level of analysis will be able to gain a more textured and 
comprehensive understanding of both foreign policy and international relations. 
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